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1 Introduction
Given that there are large inequalities across countries in income per capita
and output per worker,1 one of the central questions in economics is to ask
what the primary mechanism is that persistently generates such disparity be-
tween rich and poor countries. The so-called convergence theory (the catch-
up theory) argues that, under the assumptions of free access to production
techniques and free trade, per capita incomes in poorer nations will tend to
grow faster than in richer nations, due to the di¤erence of diminishing re-
turns. Thus, all nations would converge in terms of per capita income (more
precisely, income per hours worked).
On the contrary, there have been many works which suggest that a spe-
cic institutional structure in the real world engenders the persistent feature
of economic inequality between rich and poor countries. The classical lit-
erature of the dependence school, such as Emmanuel (1972), argues that
institutionalized wage di¤erentials between wealthy developed nations and
poor less-developed nations result in the world economy being characterized
by a systematic feature of the unequal exchange of labor between these na-
tions.2 Sokolo¤ and Engerman (2000) suggest that in the pre-modern world
economy, factor endowments are a central determinant of structural inequal-
ity, but that the role of institutions is signicant for the persistency of such
inequality. Korotayev, Goldstone, and Zinkina (2015) discuss the crucial role
of non-economic forces, such as demographics, to explain the replacement of
the Great Divergence phase with the Great Convergence phase.3
In the theoretical works, Roemer (1982; 1983) and Yoshihara and Kaneko
(2016) show that even in perfectly competitive markets, the unequal exchange
of labor (UE) can emerge. For instance, according to the latters work, given
a simple static model of international trade, an unequal distribution of capital
endowments engenders UE between rich and poor nations even as it leads to
the international division of labor by which all nations can enjoy the mutual
1For instance, see Maddison (2001).
2This argument was criticized by Samuelson (1976, 1978) and Ben-David (1993). The
literature related to this debate is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. For
a discussion of the classic contributions, we refer the reader to the excellent reviews by
Bacha (1978) and Gri¢ n and Gurley (1985).
3The recent literature, for instance, Allen (2011) and Sala-i-Martin (2006), characterizes
the world economy in twenty centuries as the Great Divergence until the early 1970s, which
has been replaced by the Great Convergence since the late 1980s.
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gains from trade. This result is also consistent with the classical view of Marx
(1968, chapter 20, (e)) who notes that a richer country exploits a poorer
one, even when the latter benets from the exchange.
As a body, these works suggest the following fundamentally theoretical
question: are free trade mechanisms or non-economic factors the main source
for the persistent inequality among nations? If the answer is the former,
it may imply that the inequality between rich and poor nations emerges
persistently in perfectly competitive environments even without any non-
economic forces. If the answer is the latter, this result may give a theoretical
foundation to the arguments discussed in the empirical literature, such as
Sokolo¤ and Engerman (2000) and Korotayev et al (2015).
To address this theoretical question in this paper, we introduce a simple
intertemporal model of perfectly competitive international trade. To provide
a measure of inequality in our model, we apply the notion of UE. This notion
is relevant to the huge literature of the dependence school and it gives us a
simple measure of the income inequality per hours worked. Our subject here
is then reduced to checking whether the free trade mechanism can persis-
tently engender UE in perfectly competitive environments, even if the UE
initially emerges due to an unequal distribution of capital among nations.
The solution to this fundamental question is not obvious. The convergence
theory mentioned above is not a useful guide, as it seems to rely crucially on
the diminishing returns structure of macroeconomic growth models.
The answer to this question is that it is generally impossible to gener-
ate persistent UE via the free trade mechanism alone, even under the non-
diminishing returns structure of a multi-sectoral dynamic general equilibrium
model. This implies that the persistent feature of UE observed in the real
world economy should be attributed to some non-economic factors outside of
the perfectly competitive mechanism.
The model developed here includes, like Roemer (1982; 1983) and Yoshi-
hara and Kaneko (2016), the simple feature that all nations can access a
common Leontief production technique and have a common leisure pref-
erence. This preference means nations are primarily concerned with their
citizensenjoyment of free hours (or leisure time), given that a common sub-
sistence consumption bundle, necessary for the citizenssurvival, is ensured.
We call such an intertemporal model a pre-industrial world economy,4 since
this leisure preference was ubiquitous in the pre-industrial society of early
4Roemer (1982) named the same economic model a pre-chapitalist economy.
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mercantilism before the 17th century, as Kawakita (2010) argues.
With this model of a pre-industrial world economy, we develop an in-
tertemporal general equilibrium analysis. Each nation takes present prices
and an innite sequence of expected prices and solves an optimal plan of
intertemporal economic activities over an innite horizon, subject to the
standard budget and feasibility constraints. Here, each nation is assumed to
have no time preference. The standard time preference model is not appeal-
ing for this subject, as will be discussed in more detail in section 2. Therefore,
the catching-up optimality criterion developed by von Weizsäcker (1965) and
Gale (1967) is applied to dene the nations optimization program. As in
the standard model of international trade theory, all commodities can be
exchanged in the world market, but neither international labor nor capital
markets exist. A free trade equilibrium is specied by a prole of an in-
nite sequence of prices and of each nations optimal plan of intertemporal
economic activities, such that the aggregate excess demand condition is satis-
ed in each period of production. We call such an equilibrium a reproducible
solution (RS).5
Given this equilibrium notion, we characterize almost all such equilibria
in terms of the persistency of UE. The denition of UE is specied as the dif-
ference between the supply of labor hours and the sum of direct and indirect
labor inputs needed to produce the subsistence commodity bundle as a net
output, following the standard literature of UE exploitation theory.6 First,
the set of RSs is partitioned into two subsets: one of incompletely specialized
equilibria in which factor price equalization holds at every period; and the
other as the complement of the rst type. Second, note that all of the RSs in
the second category are characterized by labor-value pricing (the commodity
price vector at every period is proportional to the labor value) and so no
UE emerges. Therefore, we will focus only on the rst type, which we call
incompletely specialized RSs.
We rst characterize the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the emer-
gence of UE at each period in an incompletely specialized RS. UE emerges if
and only if the distribution of the nationsreal interestincomes (nominal in-
terest income minus speculation income obtained by utilizing the variation of
commodity prices) at this period is unequal (Theorem 1 in section 3.2). This
5The RS discussed in this paper is an intertemporal extension of the static and sta-
tionary version of reproducible solutions discussed by Roemer (1982) and Yoshihara and
Kaneko (2016).
6This point will be discussed in section 3.1 in detail.
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theorem generalizes the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem (Okishio,
1963; Morishima, 1974; Medvegyev, 2013) of a static, stationary free trade
equilibrium (Yoshihara and Kaneko, 2016) to a non-stationary intertemporal
free trade equilibrium.
Second, we show that the observed UE in an incompletely specialized RS
will disappear in the innite limit of time (Theorem 2 in section 3.3). Thus,
without any additional assumption, all nations are shown to supply the same
labor hours and earn the same net income in the innite limit of time. This
may verify that economies converge through the perfectly competitive in-
ternational trade mechanism alone: unlike conventional convergence theory,
neither economic growth nor diminishing returns to scale is indispensable.
We also classify two types of mechanisms which drive the observed UE
to vanish, according to the type of incompletely specialized RS. One type
has an innite sequence of equilibrium commodity prices which converge to
a stationary price vector; and the other has no such sequence. Interestingly,
in the rst type of RSs, the converged stationary price vector is always the
labor-value pricing, and so the realinterest rate converges to zero, which
drives the emerging UE to disappear in the innite limit (Corollary 3 in
section 3.3). This observation resembles the standard argument of dynamic
general equilibrium theory which shows the convergence of the equilibrium
sequence of interest rates to the rate of time preference.
A more interesting observation relates to the second type of RS, in which
equilibrium commodity prices do not converge to any stationary price vector.
In this case, the associated sequence of realinterest rates does not converge
to zero. However, the distribution of each nations capital endowments tends
to be equalized in the innite limit even though it is unequal in the initial
period, which makes UE disappear in the long run (Corollary 4 in section 3.3).
This is a surprising and perhaps new observation, which is not conjectured
from the standard argument of dynamic general equilibrium theory.
Before closing this section, we should explain why our special attention
to the class of pre-industrial world economies is reasonable, given the fun-
damental question raised above. It is because our economic model with
the leisure preference provides us with the simplest and coherent micro-
foundation for the stationary economies with no capital accumulation nor
population growth. Indeed, as shown later (Proposition 4 in section 2.2),
an intrinsic feature of intertemporal free trade equilibria in pre-industrial
world economies is the innite repetition of simple reproduction of a station-
ary capital stock with no population growth. Therefore, the main theorems
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obtained in such economies are completely independent of the complicated
issues involved in capital accumulation and population growth.7 It allows
us to straightforwardly conclude from Corollaries 3 and 4 that, in perfectly
competitive environments, the free trade mechanism alone cannot engender
the persistent feature of UE. It also implies that the generated UE cannot
persist even if scarcity of capital is preserved.
Another reason for our special attention to pre-industrial world economies
is relevant to the debate over how to dene the notion of UE, for which there
have been many proposals (such as Okishio (1963), Morishima (1973, 1974),
Roemer (1982a, chapter 5), and Dumenil (1980, 1984)-Foley (1982)).8 Inter-
estingly, all of these proposals are reduced to the classical denition proposed
by Okishio (1963) and Morishima (1973) within the class of pre-industrial
world economies,9 and so we can focus only on the classical denition with-
out loss of generality. Furthermore, the impossibility theorem has a strong
implication that regardless of which alternative UE-formulation is selected,
UE is unable to persist in perfectly competitive free trade environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
basic model and an equilibrium notion. Section 3.1 denes the formulation of
exploitation as UE. Section 3.2 discusses the existence and characterization
of free trade equilibria with and without UE, and Section 3.3 shows that the
generated UE tends to disappear in the innite long run. Finally, Section 4
concludes the paper.
7Because of this feature, the main theorems in this paper are logically compatible with
the analysis of Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008). First, the latter addresses the world
economy in the second phase of industrial revolution, which is beyond the scope of this
paper. Second, they argue that (human) capital accumulation and population growth
are the main factors to generate the Great Divergence in that phase, which is completely
consistent with the main results of this paper.
8These works suggest that, whenever a production technology more complex than the
Leontief one is assumed, whether exploitative UE is observed or not in perfectly competi-
tive economies may vary according to which alternative formulation is adopted. This issue
is axiomatically analyzed by Yoshihara (2010, 2017) and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015,
2017a, 2017b).
9This property is shown by Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015, 2017a) and Yoshihara
(2017).
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2 Model and preliminary analysis
2.1 Economy
A world economy (economy, in short) comprises a set of nations, N =
f1; ::; Ng, with generic element  2 N . In an economy, there are n = 2
types of (purely private) commodities that are transferable in markets. The
production technology, commonly accessible by all nations, is a xed Leontief
production technology, (A;L), where A is an n  n non-negative matrix of
input coe¢ cients, and L is a 1n positive vector of direct labor coe¢ cients.
Here, A is assumed to be productive and indecomposable.10
Assume that for each production period, the maximal amount of labor
supply by every nation is equal to unity. That is, there is no di¤erence in the
size of the population or in labor skills (human capital) among nations. In
every period t, each nation requires a positive vector of commodity bundle b 2
Rn++, which every citizen in every nation must consume for his/her survival in
one period of production; this is called the subsistence consumption bundle.
Let ! 2 Rn++ be the world endowments of material input goods at the
beginning of the initial period of production. Note that, given the Leontief
technology (A;L), at least !Nb  A (I   A) 1 (Nb) of material input vector
must be endowed in the economy in order to reproduce the subsistence bun-
dle Nb in every period. Therefore, we shall assume that ! = !Nb holds.11
Moreover, we shall also assume !  !Nb+Nb, which implies a non-free lunch
in the initial period. Likewise, at least L (I   A) 1 (Nb) of aggregate labor
must be endowed in the economy. As the maximal aggregate labor supply is
given by N , we shall assume that N > L (I   A) 1 (Nb).
As mentioned in the introduction, we shall focus on a specic type of
preference prole in this economy, in that every nation has a leisure prefer-
ence dened as follows. Let C  c 2 Rn+ j c = b	  [0; 1] be the consump-
tion space common to all nations, where [0; 1] represents the space of leisure
consumption. Then, every nation has the common instantaneous welfare
10Let J be the index set of As dimension. Then, A is said to be decomposable if there
is a pair of J1 and J2 such that J = J1 [ J2, J1 \ J2 = ?, J1; J2 6= ?, and aij = 0 for
i 2 J1; j 2 J2. If A is indecomposable, then: for each i, there exists j such that aij > 0
and i 6= j; and for each j, there exists i such that aij > 0 and i 6= j.
11For all vectors x = (x1; : : : ; xn) and y = (y1; : : : ; yn) 2 Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi
(i = 1; : : : ; n); x  y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if xi > yi
(i = 1; : : : ; n).
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function u : C ! R, dened as follows: for each (c; l) 2 C,
u (c; l) = 1  l,
where l is the amount of labor supply. This form of common welfare function
implies that no nation is concerned with an increase in consumption goods
beyond the subsistence level, b, but they evaluate their social welfare in terms
of the increase in free hours (leisure time), once b is ensured.
A world economy is thus dened by the prole hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i, which
we call a pre-industrial world economy (economy, in short). This economy
is assumed to have the time structure of production, such that production
takes one period. The material inputs available in the present period cannot
exceed the amount of material input commodities accumulated by the end
of the preceding period of production.
In such an economy, each nation decides its plan of economic activities
over an innite-horizon of periods. Unlike the standard macroeconomic in-
tertemporal models, we assume that every nation has no time preference and
so no discount factor is introduced. Let us explain why we focus on the case
of no time preference. First, if a time preference is introduced and the opti-
mization problem is given by the maximization of the innite additive sum of
discounted one-period welfare functions, then UE emerges persistently. This
is shown because the equilibrium sequence of interest rates converges to a
positive rate of time preference in this setting. Second, the general normative
signicance of time preference has been questioned by many economists and
political philosophers (include Ramsey, 1928; Rawls, 1971; Sidgwick,1907).
While time discounting may be relevant in the positive analysis of individual
choices, as Veneziani (2013) emphatically argues, the role of pure time pref-
erence in exploitation theories is much less obvious, since an explanation of
persistent UE based on time preference is not appealing from the normative
perspective of exploitative UE.
To deal with the case of non-discounting, we will employ the concept of
catching-up optimality developed by von Weizsäcker (1965) and Gale (1967),
which is formulated as follows:
For t = 1; 2; : : :, let pt 1 be the 1  n vector of the market prices of com-
modities at the end of period t   1, which is identical to the beginning of
period t, and let (wt ; r

t ) be the wage rate and the nominal interest rate in s
domestic market at the end of period t. Moreover, let (!1)2N 2 RnN+ be a
prole of initial endowments of material input goods satisfying
P
2N !

1 = !.
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Given a price sequence,

pt 1; (wt ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
, each nation  chooses a path 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
such that: for each period, (1) wealth carried over from
the previous period, pt 1!t , is su¢ cient to purchase the material inputs, Ax

t ,
for the production activity, xt , and the commodities for speculative purposes,
t , at the beginning of the present period; (2) labor inputs l

t = Lx

t do not
exceed the amount of available labor; (3) earnings at the end of the present
period, ptxt +pt

t , are su¢ cient for consuming b and carrying over pt!

t+1 to
the next period; (4) total net revenue from the production, ptxt  pt 1Axt , is
divided into total wage income, wt Lx

t , and total interest income, r

t pt 1Ax

t ,
through the domestic market. Formally, for t = 1; 2; : : :,
pt 1Axt + pt 1

t 5 pt 1!t ; (1)
lt = Lx

t 5 1; (2)
ptx

t + pt

t = ptb+ pt!t+1; (3)
ptx

t   pt 1Axt = wt Lxt + rt pt 1Axt ; (4)
!1 2 Rn+ given; xt ; t ; !t+1 2 Rn+:
For convenience, we use the following denitions and notation. Given a price
sequence

pt 1; (wt ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
, a set of all possible production activity paths
(from !1) is dened by
x (!1) 

(x1; x

2; : : :) j
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
 2 R3n+ satises (1)-(4) for all t = 1; 2; : : :	 :
A possible production activity path fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1) is catching-up optimal
(from !1) if any possible production activity path fx0tg1t=1 2 x (!1) satises
the following:
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt ) = 0:
Before dening the concept of equilibrium, we show a necessary condition
for catching-up optimal paths:
Proposition 1: Given

pt 1; (wt ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
with pt 1 > 0 and wt > 0
(8 2 N ) for all t = 1; 2; : : :, let fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1), with xt  0 (t = 1; 2; : : :),
be catching-up optimal for every  2 N . Then,
wt+1 =
 
1 + rt+1

wt (5)
holds for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. See Appendix.
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2.2 Equilibrium and its Preliminary Results
We now introduce the concept of equilibrium for our model.
Denition 1: For an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N, a reproducible solu-
tion (RS) is a price system

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
and an associated possible
allocation
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
such that:
(a) fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1) is catching-up optimal for every  2 N ;
(b) xt + 

t = Nb+ !t+1 for all t = 1; 2; : : :; and
(c) Axt + 

t 5 !t for all t = 1; 2; : : :,
where xt 
P
2N x

t , 

t 
P
2N 

t , and !

t+1 
P
2N !

t+1.
Denition 1 states that in an RS, taking the price system

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
,
(a) every nation chooses its own optimal plan; (b) the standard excess de-
mand condition is satised; and nally, (c) the aggregate activities of pro-
duction are feasible under the stock of material input goods at each period.
In what follows, we will devote special attention to the subset of equilibria
with incomplete specialization, in which each nation produces all commodi-
ties.
Denition 2: For an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N, an RS,D
pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
;
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
E
, is said to be incompletely
specialized if it satises xt > 0 for every  2 N at every t = 1; 2; : : : .
Note that if an RS is incompletely specialized, then
pt = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1A+ w

t L > 0 (6)
holds for every  2 N by xt > 0 at every t, as pt 5 (1 + rt ) pt 1A+ wt L
is a necessary condition of an equilibrium price vector.
It is possible to develop some preliminary results toward the characteriza-
tion of incompletely specialized RSs. First, factor price equalization among
nations can be established under incompletely specialized RSs.
Proposition 2 [Factor Price Equalization]: Given an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N,
let

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
be an incompletely specialized RS price system.
Then, for each period t, the followings hold:
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(i) if there exists at least one pair of i and j such that i 6= j and (p

t 1A)i
Li
6=
(pt 1A)j
Lj
, then (wt ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ) for every ;  2 N ;
(ii) if (wt ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ) for every ;  2 N , then
 
wt+1; r

t+1

=
 
wt+1; r

t+1

for every ;  2 N .
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 2, factor prices are equalized across all nations for every pe-
riod under any incompletely specialized RS whenever p0A and L are linearly
independent. Except in a rare case, it is always possible to select such a p0.
Therefore, in the following discussion we may focus on those incompletely
specialized RSs in which factor prices are equalized among nations for every
period, without loss of generality.
As we argued above, the price system of any incompletely specialized RS
must satisfy conditions (5) and (6). Therefore, without loss of generality, we
can specify the class of equilibrium prices of incompletely specialized RSs.
Formally, let us denote a sequence of interest rates frtg1t=1  R+ by r, where
R  R [ f1g is the extended real line. Let p0 > 0 be such that p0A and
L are linearly independent. Then, given such p0 > 0, and w0 > 0 and r,
let us denote the price sequence fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 with wt = (1 + rt)wt 1
and pt = (1 + rt) pt 1A + wtL for each t = 1; 2; : : : ; by p (p0; w0; r). There-
fore, when we write fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r), this implies the se-
quence fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 satises conditions (5) and (6); frtg1t=1 = r; and
its commodity price and wage rate at t = 0 are p0 and w0. Thus, if
fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 is the equilibrium price system of an incompletely special-
ized RS, then fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) must hold.
Let v  L (I   A) 1 be called the labor value vector. By the assumptions
of A and L, v > 0 holds. Now, we can provide the second preliminary result
toward the characterizations of incompletely specialized RSs:
Proposition 3: Let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) for r  R+. If (p0; w0) 2
Rn+R++ satises p0 = p0A+w0L > 0, then (1 + rt) pt 1  pt = 0 holds for
all t = 1; 2; : : :. Specically, the following hold:
(i) (1 + rt) pt 1   pt  0 for all t = 1; 2; : : : if and only if p0  p0A+ w0L;
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(ii) There exists q > 0 such that for each t = 0; 1; : : :, pt = & tq holds for
some & t > 0 if and only if there exists &v > 0 such that q = &vv.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3(ii) implies that an equilibrium price system in an incom-
pletely specialized RS is characterized by stationary relative prices of com-
modities if and only if they are labor-value pricing, i.e., the price vectors are
proportional to the labor-value vector through time. Such a case is derived
in a quite limited situation as the following corollary suggests.
Corollary 1: For r  R+, let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) with p0 =
p0A+ w0L. Then, the following two are equivalent:
(i) for each t = 0; 1; : : :, there exists & t > 0 such that pt = & tv;
(ii) p0 and L are the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector for A or p0 = p0A+w0L.
In summary, Proposition 3(ii) and Corollary 1 imply that an equilibrium
price system in an incompletely specialized RS is characterized by stationary
relative prices of commodities if and only if either the initial price vector
of commodities is labor-value pricing or this vector and the labor coe¢ cient
vector are the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector.12
Therefore, unless the condition of Corollary 1(ii) is satised, the equi-
librium price system of the incompletely specialized RS is characterized as
a non-stationary relative price sequence of commodities. Note that such
an equilibrium price system p (p0; w0; r) may have the feature that rt > R
(8t = 1; 2; : : :), where R > 0 is such that 1
1+R
is the Perron-Frobenius eigen-
value of A,13 which will be discussed in Section 3.3 below.
12Note that, from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, the focus of our attention on the class
of incompletely specialized RSs is relevant to the main purpose of this paper. Indeed, when
we consider p0A and L to be linearly dependent in order to allow the case of RSs with
unequal factor prices among nations, it implies that p0 is labor-value pricing according to
Yoshihara and Kaneko (2016; Lemma 1). Then, by Corollary 1, pt is labor-value pricing
for every t = 1; 2; : : : . Then, as argued later in section 3.2, such an RS does not involve
any exploitation from the initial period, which is outside of our concerns in this paper.
13This is in contrast with the general observation of the stationary equilibrium prices.
Indeed, with a Leontief production technology (A;L), when a stationary equilibrium price
system is given by p = (1 + r) pA+wL for some r = 0 and w > 0, it follows that r 2 [0; R).
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Given an incompletely specialized RS, the associated sequence of feasi-
ble allocations
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
is called an RS-allocation. Let us
investigate RS-allocations in the rest of this section.
To simplify the argument, we will focus on the case ! = !Nb. The
assumption, ! = !Nb, can be justied by the fact that it corresponds to
the long-run state of capital accumulation.14 Then, it can be shown that
the aggregate production activity xt in any period t of an RS is identical
to (I   A) 1 (Nb), while the aggregate stock of material inputs for the next
periods production, !t+1, is equal to !
Nb.
Proposition 4: Let an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N satisfy ! = !Nb.
Then, any RS allocation
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
satises xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb),
t = 0, and !

t+1 = !
Nb for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 4, the economy as a whole does not have capital accumulation.
Moreover, under ! = !Nb, any RS involves t = 0 (t = 1; 2; : : :).
In the following discussion of this subsection, we will show that under ! =
!Nb, only allocations with t = 0 for any  2 N (t = 1; 2; : : :) are consistent
with an RS. First, the following lemma establishes that if a catching-up
optimal path is truncated after T periods, it solves the corresponding nite-
time program with the terminal time T .
Lemma 1: Let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) and a path
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
be catching-up optimal from !1 2 Rn+n f0g. Arbitrarily x any number T
with the corresponding stock !T+1. Then, the path
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	T
t=1
from
t = 1 until t = T solves the following program:
(MP T ) minf(xt;t;!t+1)gTt=1
TX
t=1
Lxt
subject to: for each t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , the constraints (1)-(3) hold;
!1 = !

1; and pT!T+1 = pT!

T+1.
14In fact, it can be proved that, even if !  !Nb, any RS allocation involves !t ! !Nb
as t!1. For a more detailed argument, see Lemma II, Propositions A.2 and A.3 in the
Addendum of this paper.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Secondly, the next lemma shows that the form of f(xt ;0; Axt )g1t=1 can consti-
tute a catching-up optimal solution by examining the corresponding myopic
program (MP T ).
Lemma 2: Taking (p0; w0) 2 Rn+  R++ and r  R+ such that p0 = p0A +
w0L, let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r). Given !1; !T+1 2 Rn+n f0g, let
f(xt ;0; Axt )gTt=1  R3n+ fulll pt 1Axt = pt 1!t , Lxt 5 1, and pt (I   A)xt =
ptb for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T . Then, it constitutes a solution to (MP T ).
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 4 and Lemmas 1 and 2, we can summarize.
Corollary 2: Let an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N satisfy ! = !Nb.
Taking (p0; w0) 2 Rn+  R++ and r  R+ such that p0 = p0A + w0L, let
fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r). Then, a feasible plan f(xt ;0; Axt )g1t=1
which satises all of the constraints (1)-(3) and fullls pt 1Axt = pt 1!

t ,
Lxt 5 1, and pt (I   A)xt = ptb for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , constitutes a catching-
up optimal solution.
Thus, we hereafter omit t and denote an RS allocation by
n 
xt ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
.
Moreover, under ! = !Nb where no RS involves capital accumulation (by
Proposition 4), we may focus only on the types of RSs where no agent saves.
That is, pt!t+1 = ptAx

t holds for any  2 N and every t, which we call
interior RS (IRS) following Veneziani (2007).
3 Characterizations of free trade equilibrium
in terms of UE
3.1 Exploitation as UE
In this subsection, we introduce a denition of exploitation as UE. Note
that while the notion of exploitation primarily refers to an asymmetric rela-
tionship between agents, there have been many discussions about what the
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exploitation is. The notion of exploitation as UE has been central in ex-
ploitation theories as argued in the recent literature such as Wright (2000)
and Vrousalis (2013). There are some alternative proposals on exploitation
of factors other than labor, such as Roemer (1982a).15 However, even within
the UE theory of exploitation, there have been debates over how to formulate
the notion of exploitation as UE, and indeed many alternative proposals ex-
ist, such as Okishio (1963), Morishima (1973, 1974), Roemer (1982a, chapter
5), and Dumenil (1980, 1984)-Foley (1982), etc.
Given this debate, the recent literature, such as Yoshihara (2010, 2017),
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009), and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015, 2017a,
2017b, 2018), develops an axiomatic study on reasonable formal denition
of exploitation. As Yoshihara (2017) and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015,
2017a) argue, whatever the outcome of these debates, any formal denition of
UE-exploitation within the admissible domain can be reduced to the following
uniform denition within the class of economies with the leisure preference
and Leontief production technology, which was originated by Roemer (1982,
Denitions 2.2)16:
Denition 5: For any economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N, let pt 1; (wt ; rt )	1t=1
be an imperfectly specialized RS at period t associated with
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
.
Then, the amount of socially necessary labor required to produce b as a net
15Fleurbaey (2014) characterizes the alternative theories of exploitation including the
UE theory and Roemers (1982a) theory of property-relational exploitation.
16The UE formulated in Denition 5 is worth calling exploitation, as Roemer (1982, p.
168) emphasized as follows: for some producers  and , Lxt > vb > Lx

t at period t.
That is, Producer  is working less time than is socially necessary to reproduce himself
and producer  is working longer than is socially necessary. Producer  is exploiting .
This comes about because ....  is wealthier than , and is able to use his wealth as leverage
through the exchange mechanism to force  to work forhim. .... That this phenomenon
deserves to be called Marxian exploitation can be seen by the following. Suppose  and
 were the only producers in the economy, and  expropriated s endowment and killed
him. Producer  would now be wealthier than before; yet, at any RS for the new economy
in which only he is a member, he will have to work time vb, longer than when  was
there. Thus, exploitation is an explicitly social phenomenon:  can get away with working
less than vb only because there is someone else working more than vb, to "support" him.
Producer  appears to be gaining at the expense of , ... even though all producers gain
from trade at a reproducible solution.
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output is
1
N
L
 X
2N
xt
!
= L (I   A) 1 b = vb.
Moreover, for each nation  2 N , the supply of labor hours to earn revenue
pt b for its own survival is Lx

t at period t, and then
 is an exploiting nation at period t() Lxt < vb;
 is an exploited nation at period t() Lxt > vb.
Denoting the sets of exploiters and exploited nations at period t by N tert
and N tedt , respectively, we also use the following denition, which was again
originated by Roemer (1982, Denitions 2.2).
Denition 6: For any economy,

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N, let pt 1; (wt ; rt )	1t=1
be an imperfectly specialized RS associated with
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
.
Then,
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N is inegalitarian at period t if and only if N tert 6= ?
and N tedt 6= ?.
Thus, an inegalitarian RS allocation at period t implies the generation of ex-
ploitative relations at this period. By contrast, we can state that for any econ-
omy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N, an RS allocation at period t,  xt ; t ; !t+12N ,
is egalitarian if and only if Lxt = Lx

t for all ;  2 N .
The form of exploitation in Denition 5 is applied to the context of in-
ternational economies by Roemer (1982) and Yoshihara and Kaneko (2016).
As mentioned above, when a more general class of production technology is
considered, many alternative denitions of exploitation have been proposed.
However, all of these alternatives can be regarded as an extension of De-
nition 5 into the class of such general economies. Therefore, the following
characterization of the persistency of inegalitarian RSs is free from debate
over the proper denition of labor exploitation. These results can be applied
independently of this particular denition of exploitation.
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3.2 Characterizations
This subsection provides a characterization for the equilibria involving UE,
which is based on the exploitative relationship. Given an incompletely spe-
cialized IRS, where its associated RS allocation can have the form of

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=0
by Corollary 2, we characterize the necessary and su¢ cient condition for this
RS to involve UE. As a preliminary step, let !b !Nb
N
.
Theorem 1: Given an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N with ! = !Nb,
let

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (p0; w

0; r
) be an IRS with

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
.
Then, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, this RS is inegalitarian at period t if and only if
there exists  2 N such that (1 + rt ) pt 1!t  pt!t+1 6= (1 + rt ) pt 1!b pt!b.
Proof. For each t = 1; 2; : : :, let !t+1 = Ax

t ( 2 N ). By Proposition 4,
we can see that !t =
P
2N !

1 = !
Nb for all t = 1; 2; : : :. First, consider
the case of (1 + rt ) p

t 1 = p

t for all t = 1; 2; : : :, which is equivalent to
p0 = p

0A + w

0L by (i) of Proposition 3. Note that constraint (1) yields
pt 1!

t = p

t 1!

t+1 ( 2 N ) for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Fix t = 1; 2; : : : arbitrarily.
Then, (1 + rt ) p

t 1 = p

t and p

t 1!

t = p

t 1!

t+1 ( 2 N ) imply
(1 + rt ) p

t 1!

t   pt!t+1 = 0 = (1 + rt ) pt 1!b pt!b
for any  2 N . On the other hand, from constraints (3) with equality, (4),
and (1 + rt ) p

t 1 = p

t , we derive
wtLx

t = p

t (I   A)xt = pt b
for any  2 N . Moreover, since xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb) as proven by Proposi-
tion 4,
pt b = p

t (I   A)
xt
N
= wtL
xt
N
= wt vb:
Altogether, under the case of (1 + rt ) p

t 1 = p

t for all t = 1; 2; : : : considered
here, (1 + rt ) p

t 1!

t   pt!t+1 = (1 + rt ) pt 1!b pt!b and Lxt = vb must
hold for any  2 N .
Next, we consider the case of (1 + rt ) p

t 1  pt for some t, which follows
from p0  p0A+w0L by (i) of Proposition 3. Then, the constraints (3) with
equality and (4) imply that, for each t = 1; 2; : : :,
pt b+ p

t!

t+1 = p

tx

t = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1!

t+1 + w

tLx

t (8 2 N );
Npt b+ p

t!t+1 = p

tx

t = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1!t+1 + w

tLx

t ;
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and the constraint (1) yields that for each t = 1; 2; : : :, pt 1!

t = p

t 1!

t+1
( 2 N ). Since (1 + rt ) pt 1   pt  0 and pt 1!t = pt 1!t+1, we have
(1 + rt ) p

t 1!

t  pt!t+1 > 0, as well as (1 + rt ) pt 1!t pt!t+1 > 0 given that
!t = !t+1 = !
Nb. Let t  (1+r

t )p

t 1!

t
pt!t+1
 1 > 0 and t  (1+r

t )p

t 1!t
pt!t+1
 1 > 0.
Note that (1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt  0 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
t =
(1+rt )pt 1!

t
pt!t+1
  1 > 0 and t = (1+r

t )p

t 1!t
pt!t+1
  1 > 0. Then, for each
t = 1; 2; : : :,
pt b+ p

t!

t+1 = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1!

t + w

tLx

t = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1!

t+1 + w

tLx

t
= (1 + t ) p

t!

t+1 + w

tLx

t (8 2 N );
Npt b+ p

t!t+1 = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1!t + w

tLx

t = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1!t+1 + w

tLx

t
= (1 + t ) p

t!t+1 + w

tLx

t :
These yield, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, pt b = 

t p

t!

t+1 + w

tLx

t (8 2 N ) and
pt b = 

tp

t!
b + wt vb. Then, we obtain
Lxt T vb, t pt!t+1 S tpt!b
, (1 + rt ) pt 1!t   pt!t+1 S (1 + rt ) pt 1!b   pt!b
, (1 + rt ) pt 1!t+1   pt!t+1 S (1 + rt ) pt 1!b   pt!b
, (1 + rt ) pt 1 (I   A)  wtL!t+1 S (1 + rt ) pt 1 (I   A)  wtL!b:
Therefore, sinceX
2N

(1 + rt ) p

t 1 (I   A)  wtL

!t+1 =

(1 + rt ) p

t 1 (I   A)  wtL

!Nb,
we can see that, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, there exists  2 N such that (1 + rt ) pt 1!t  
pt!

t+1 6= (1 + rt ) pt 1!b   pt!b if and only if there exist ;  2 N such that
Lxt > vb and Lx

t < vb, where the latter implies that this IRS is inegalitar-
ian at period t.
Theorem 1 establishes that in IRSs, a nation is exploiting if and only
if its interest income is higher than the world average interest income, and
similarly, a nation is exploited if and only if its interest income is lower than
the world average.
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3.3 The impossibility of the persistent UE
This subsection examines the persistent generation of UE, i.e., it checks
whether an RS being inegalitarian at any nite period involves UE even in
the innite limit. First, the following theorem establishes that UE generated
in an IRS necessarily tends to disappear in the innite limit:
Theorem 2: Let

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N be an economy with ! = !Nb. For
p0 = p0A + w0L, let

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (p0; w

0; r
) be an incompletely
specialized IRS with

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
. Then, limt!1 Lxt = vb holds for
any  2 N .
Proof. Fix t = 1; 2; : : :, arbitrarily. Since pt = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1A + w

tL and
wt = (1 + r

t )w

t 1, we have from p

t (I   A)xt = pt b (8 2 N ) that
tY
=1
(1 + r )w

0Lx

t = p

t b 

(1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt

Axt 5 pt b.
Moreover, since pt =
Qt
=1 (1 + r

 ) p

0A
t +
Qt
=1 (1 + r

 )w

0L
Pt
=0A
 ,
Lxt 5
pt bQt
=1 (1 + r

 )w

0
=
p0
w0
Atb+ L
tX
=0
Ab, (8t) . (10)
Note that At ! 0 as t ! 1. Then, the rst term on the rightmost side
of (10), p

0
w0
Atb, converges to 0 in the innite limit of time. Also, the second
term has the property, limt!1 L
Pt
=0A
b = L (I   A) 1 b = vb. Thus, (10)
implies limt!1 Lxt 5 vb. Moreover, such an allocation attains as an RS
given that limt!1 Lxt = vb. Indeed, if limt!1 Lx

t < vb for some  2 N ,
then limt!1 Lx

t > vb for some  2 N n fg, which violates the feasibility
condition for .
What is the underlying mechanism to establish the impossibility of persis-
tent UE? The following observation of an equilibrium price system p (p0; w0; r)
under the IRS gives us useful information:
Proposition 5: For r  R+, let fpt 1; (wt; rt; )g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) with
p0  p0A+ w0L. Then, the followings holds:
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(i) if lim supt!1 rt < R, then limt!1 [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt] = 0; and con-
versely,
(ii) if lim inft!1 rt > R, then lim inft!1 [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]i > 0 for all i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 classies the equilibrium price systems of incompletely special-
ized RSs, according to whether the nominal interest rates in the innite limit
remains above or below the threshold. In the former case, the real interest
rate converges to zero: limt!1 [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt] = 0, while in the latter, it
remains positive.
Remark 1: Proposition 5 suggests that an equilibrium price system of an
incompletely specialized RS does not necessarily converge to a stationary
system of relative prices of commodities. Indeed, it can be shown that there
exists an incompletely specialized RS in which the sequence of equilibrium
interest rates is such that lim inft!1 rt > R.17
The classication by Proposition 5 is key for characterizing the mechanism
to make the generated UE disappear in the innite limit. First, we have.
Corollary 3: Let

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N be an economy with ! = !Nb.
For p0 = p0A + w0L, let

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (p0; w

0; r
) be an incom-
pletely specialized IRS with

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
such that lim supt!1 r

t <
R. Then, limt!1 Lxt = vb holds for any  2 N , while limt!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1!

t   pt!t+1

=
0 for any  2 N .
Proof. By Proposition 5(i), limt!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt

= 0 holds. Then, for
any  2 N ,
lim
t!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1!

t   pt!t+1

= lim
t!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt

!t+1
= 0 = lim
t!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt

!b,
by pt 1!

t = p

t 1Ax

t = p

t 1!

t+1. Then, by Theorem 1, it concludes that
limt!1 Lxt = vb for any  2 N .
17See the Addendum for a detailed discussion of it.
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Thus, Corollary 3 shows that the generated UE tends to disappear in the
innite limit while, equivalently, the real interest income converges to zero.
This result is similar to Venezianis (2007) result, which shows that under
an economy with a labor market, UE tends to disappear in the innite limit,
due to the tendency of the prot rates to converge to zero.
However, an IRS does not necessarily fulll limt!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt

=
0, so that the real interest rate does not necessarily converge to zero. In
this case, the argument underlying Corollary 3 cannot apply. Even in such
cases, an IRS tends to equalize the associated allocations across nations and
eventually attains no UE. In fact:
Corollary 4: Let

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N be an economy with ! = !Nb. For
p0  p0A + w0L, let

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (p0; w

0; r
) be an incompletely
specialized IRS with

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
such that lim inft!1 rt > R. Then,
limt!1 Lxt = vb holds for any  2 N , while equivalently limt!1 !t+1 = !b
(8 2 N ), i.e., the wealth distribution converges to be egalitarian in the
innite limit.
Proof. By Proposition 5(ii), limt!1

(1 + rt ) p

t 1   pt

> 0 holds. Then, as
p0  p0A+w0L and p0A and L are linearly independent, pt does not converge
to be labor value pricing by Proposition 3(ii). Equivalently, pt (I   A) and
L do not converge to be linearly dependent.
Let Lx  limt!1 Lxt for any  2 N . By Theorem 2, Lx = Lx
and pt (I   A)xt = pt b = pt (I   A)xt for any t. Suppose that x 6=
x for some ;  2 N . Then, pt (I   A)  (xt   xt ) = 0 for any t and
limt!1 L (xt   xt ) = 0 with x 6= x imply that pt (I   A) and L con-
verge to be linearly dependent. Therefore, pt converges to be labor value
pricing as t ! 1, which is a contradiction. Thus, x = x holds for any
;  2 N . This implies that limt!1 xt = (I   A) 1 b for any  2 N . This
is equivalent to limt!1 !t+1 = limt!1Ax

t = A (I   A) 1 b = !b for any
 2 N .
Remark 2: All of the main theorems in this paper can be preserved even if
the overtaking criterion is applied instead of the catching up criterion.
Remark 3: Though the result of Corollary 3 looks similar to the impossibil-
ity of persistent exploitation in Venezaini (2007), there are some signicant
di¤erences between these two. The model developed in Veneziani (2007) is
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an approximation of a continuous time model, in that prices of commodities
at the beginning of a production period are assumed to be identical to those
at the end of that period. Because of this setting, an equilibrium price sys-
tem in Veneziani (2007) can be characterized by: pt = (1 + rt) ptA + L and
pt = (1 + rt+1) pt+1 for every t = 1; 2; : : : . To preserve such a property, v
and L must be the Frobenius eigenvectors of A, and the commodity price
vector p must be labor value pricing. Under such a specic environment,
limt!1 rt = 0 holds.18 In contrast, Corollary 3 of this paper can be applied
to a broader class of environments beyond such a specic one.
Remark 4: The type of non-persistency of UE discussed in Corollary 4 may
be attributed to an intrinsic feature of economies without (international)
markets for labor or credit. For inequality (10), which is critical to derive the
non-persistent UE, is established under the assumption of pt (I   A)xt =
pt b (8 2 N ) at every period t. This condition holds as a feature of RSs
only in economies without any (international) factor market. Indeed, if we
assume a model of economies with labor markets like Veneziani (2007), then
there may exist agents in such a model, who have no endowment of material
input goods but can survive as employed workers. Since such an agent does
not satisfy pt (I   A)xt = pt b, Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 cannot apply to
such a model of economies.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented a model of innite-horizon international economies with
a leisure preference and a Leontief production technique and characterized
free trade equilibria, RSs, in terms of the persistency of UE. First, focusing
on incompletely specialized RSs where factor price equalization holds, the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for the emergence of UE was examined
(Theorem 1). Moreover, it was shown that the UE that emerged in such
equilibria tends to disappear in the innite limit (Theorem 2). Two mech-
anisms driving the observed UE to vanish were discussed. One mechanism
corresponds to the subclass of equilibria whose associated sequences of equi-
librium prices converge to the labor-value pricing. In such equilibria, the UE
18More precisely speaking, p = limt!1
Qt
=1 (1 + r ) v holds, which also implies that
limt!1 rt = 0 should hold to ensure limt!1
Qt
=1 (1 + r ) <1.
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that emerges tends to disappear because the sequences of equilibrium inter-
est rates converge to zero (Corollary 3). The other mechanism corresponds
to the subclass of equilibria in which the distributions of capital endowments
tend to be equalized in the long run. Because of this equalization, UE cannot
emerge persistently (Corollary 4). Finally, if a RS does not preserve factor
price equalization, then its equilibrium prices are the labor-value pricing, and
so no UE emerges.
Among these results, the second type of mechanism for non-persistent UE
is particularly interesting. First, such a mechanism corresponds to the case
where the equilibrium prices do not converge to any stationary price vector
and the equilibrium realinterest rates do not converge to zero. Neither the
standard literature of intertemporal general equilibrium theory nor Marxian
exploitation theory has paid attention to this case. Such a mechanism is not
vacuous, since these types of RSs can exist under a reasonable restriction of
economic environments, as shown in the Addendum. Second, the functioning
of such a mechanism may be attributed to an intrinsic feature of economies
with neither (international) labor nor credit markets. The tendency of the
distribution of capital endowments to equalize, proved in Corollary 4, relies
crucially on the property that neither labor nor credit markets are interna-
tionalized. Indeed, this equalization tendency is not necessarily observed if
either (international) labor or credit markets exist, according to Chen and
Yoshihara (2018).19
A relevant work was developed by Veneziani (2007), who also assumes
an intertemporal economy with a labor market, the leisure preference, and
no time preference, and then shows that UE tends to vanish in the innite
limit.20 However, in his model, no time structure of production like ours is
assumed, and so at every period any equilibrium commodity prices are labor-
value pricing and converge to the (absolute) labor value, as mentioned by
Remark 3 in section 3.3 above. In contrast, in a model with a time structure
of production like ours, the same two types of equilibrium sequences of prices
19Chen and Yoshihara (2018) show that, in a perfectly competitive economy with a
labor market and the leisure preference, any interior RS is associated with a sequence of
equilibrium (real) interest rates converging to zero, whenever propertyless agents of the
working class exist in the initial period.
20If the leisure preference is replaced by the standard strongly monotonic preferences in
the intertemporal economy with the labor market and no time preference, then it is even
easy to show that UE tends to vanish in the nite period of time. (See Giorgos, Veneziani,
and Yoshihara (2018).)
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(as shown in Proposition 5) can be observed even in economies with a labor
or credit market. Then, it can be shown, due to Chen and Yoshihara (2018),
that UE emerges at every period persistently if the equilibrium sequence of
prot rates or interest rates does not converge to zero. It is in a sharp contrast
with Corollary 4 of this paper obtained under the international trade model.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Let fxt g1t=1 be catching-up optimal. Note that the inequality con-
straint (3) holds with equality under optimality. Suppose on the contrary
that px + p

 > pb + p!

+1 for some  . Then, by the assumption of
xt  0 (t = 1; 2; : : :), we can take another possible path fx0tg1t=1 2 x (!1)
such that x0  x for  and x0t = xt for t = 1; 2; : : : ;    1;  + 1; : : :. We
have from L > 0 that
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt ) = (Lx0   Lx ) < 0;
which contradicts the optimality. Then, the following holds:
wt Lx

t = ptx

t   (1 + rt ) pt 1Axt by (4)
= ptb+ pt!

t+1   ptt   (1 + rt ) pt 1Axt by (3) with equality
= ptb+ pt!

t+1   (1 + rt ) pt 1 (!t   t )  ptt by (1).
Putting st  !t+1   !t , we have, from wt > 0 for any  2 N , that
Lxt =
ptb+ pts

t + [pt   (1 + rt ) pt 1] (!t   t )
wt
;
and analogically,
Lxt+1 =
pt+1b+ pt+1s

t+1 +

pt+1  
 
1 + rt+1

pt
  
!t+1   t+1

wt+1
:
As a one-period perturbation for an arbitrary  < 1, let s0  s + 
and s0+1  s+1 ++1 meet  =  +1. In the perturbation path,
Lx0 + Lx
0
+1 = Lx

 + Lx

+1 +

p


w
  (1 + r

+1)p


w+1

:
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Since fxt g1t=1 is catching-up optimal, p


w
= (1+r

+1)p


w+1
holds. Indeed, if
p
w
<
(1+r+1)p


w+1
< 0, then
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt ) =
"
p

 1
w
 
 
1 + r+1

p


w+1
#
< 0;
which contradicts the optimality of fxt g1t=1. Note the assumption of pt 1; pt >
0 for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Therefore, if pi
w
>
(1+r+1)pi
w+1
for some commodity i,
then there is a suitable perturbation i < 0 such that the perturbation path
is possible. This generates Lx0 +Lx
0
+1 < L

 +Lx

+1, which contradicts the
optimality by an argument similar to the one above. Since we take  < 1
arbitrarily, we obtain that for each t = 1; 2 : : :, pt
wt
=
(1+rt+1)pt
wt+1
, which yields
wt+1 =
 
1 + rt+1

wt by pt  0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. (i) Note that an incompletely specialized RS yields pt = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1A+
wt L for every  2 N . Fix arbitrarily ;  2 N . Then, we obtain from
(1 + rt ) p

t 1A+w

t L = p

t = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1A+w

t L that (r

t   rt ) pt 1A+
(wt   wt )L = 0. This implies that for i and j such that i 6= j and
(pt 1A)i
Li
6= (p

t 1A)j
Lj
,
(rt   rt ; wt   wt )

pt 1Aei p

t 1Aej
Li Lj

= (0; 0) :
Since the matrix 
pt 1Aei p

t 1Aej
Li Lj

is nonsingular by
(pt 1A)i
Li
6= (p

t 1A)j
Lj
, we obtain (wt ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ). Note
that this result follows for every ;  2 N , which completes the proof.
(ii) Let (wt ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ) for every ;  2 N . If ptA and
L are linearly independent, then
 
wt+1; r

t+1

=
 
wt+1; r

t+1

=
 
wt+1; r

t+1

for every ;  2 N by (i). Therefore, suppose that ptA and L are linearly
dependent. This implies that
pit+1
pjt+1
=
ptAei
ptAej
=
Li
Lj
for all i and j.
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In such a case, for any nation  2 N , any  wt+1; rt+1 2 R2+n f0g can be the
factor price vectors whenever pt+1 =
 
1 + rt+1

ptA+ w

t+1L holds. Suppose
that
 
wt+1; r

t+1
 6=  wt+1; rt+1 for some ;  2 N . First, let rt+1 > rt+1
without loss of generality. Then, by Proposition 1, it follows that
wt+1 =
 
1 + rt+1

wt >
 
1 + rt+1

wt = w

t+1.
Then,
pt+1 =
 
1 + rt+1

ptA+ w

t+1L =
 
1 + rt+1

ptA+
 
1 + rt+1

wtL
>
 
1 + rt+1

ptA+
 
1 + rt+1

wtL =
 
1 + rt+1

ptA+ w

t+1L = p

t+1,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, rt+1 = r

t+1 must hold. Second, let
wt+1 > w

t+1 without loss of generality. However, by Proposition 1, this
inequality implies that rt+1 > r

t+1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, 
wt+1; r

t+1

=
 
wt+1; r

t+1

=
 
wt+1; r

t+1

holds for every ;  2 N , whenever
(wt ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ) = (w

t ; r

t ) for every ;  2 N .
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r). We notice thatwt =
Qt
=1 (1 + r )w0
for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Then, we obtain that for any t = 1; 2; : : :,
(1 + rt) pt 1   pt =
tY
=1
(1 + r ) [p0 (I   A)  w0L]At 1 = 0 (7)
by the induction on t. Indeed,
(1 + r1) p0 p1 = (1 + r1) p0 (1 + r1) p0A w0L = (1 + r1) [p0 (I   A)  w0L]
holds and supposing
(1 + rt) pt 1   pt =
tY
=1
(1 + r ) [p0 (I   A)  w0L]At 1
26
yields
(1 + rt+1) pt   pt+1
= (1 + rt+1)
"
(1 + rt) pt 1A+
tY
=1
(1 + r )w0L
#
  (1 + rt+1) ptA 
t+1Y
=1
(1 + r )w0L
= (1 + rt+1) [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]A
=
t+1Y
=1
(1 + r ) [p0 (I   A)  w0L]At:
For (i),
0  (1 + r1) p0   p1 = (1 + r1) (p0   p0A  w0L) ;
which proves the only ifpart. For the ifpart of (i), let p0  p0A+w0L.
Then, (1 + r1) p0   p1  0. Inductively, suppose (1 + rt) pt 1   pt  0. Note
that (7) yields
(1 + rt+1) pt   pt+1 = (1 + rt+1) [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]A. (8)
Then, the indecomposability of A ensures (1 + rt+1) pt   pt+1  0 (see foot-
note 6), which completes the proof of (i).
For (ii), it su¢ ces to show the only ifpart since the ifpart is obvious.
Let q > 0 and & t > 0 satisfy pt = & tq (t = 0; 1; : : :). Fixing t arbitrarily, we
have (1 + rt+1) pt  pt+1 = [(1 + rt+1) & t   & t+1] q. Since (1 + rt+1) pt  pt+1 =
(1 + rt+1) [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]A by (7), we derive
[(1 + rt+1) & t   & t+1] q = (1 + rt+1) [(1 + rt) & t 1   & t] qA:
Then, (1 + rt) & t 1   & t = 0 holds for all t = 1; 2; : : :; or q > 0 is an eigenvec-
tor for A, and therefore, must be the unique (up to scalar) Perron-Frobenius
eigenvector by the indecomposability of A. For the former case, it is equiva-
lent to
p0 = p0A+ w0L , p0 = w0v
by (7), so that q = w0
&0
v. For the latter case, let 1
1+R
be the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue of A. Note that L must be the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of A
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as well, since
&1q = p1 = (1 + r1) p0A+ (1 + r1)w0L
=
1 + r1
1 +R
p0 + (1 + r1)w0L
=
1 + r1
1 +R
&0q + (1 + r1)w0L
, L = (1 +R) &1   (1 + r1) &0
(1 + r1) (1 +R)w0
q:
Then, from the Neumann series (I   A) 1 =P1=0A , we have that
v = L+ LA+ LA2 +    = L+ 1
1 +R
L+

1
1 +R
2
L+    = 1 +R
R
L;
and therefore, q = (1+r1)Rw0
(1+R)&1 (1+r1)&0v.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. We rst show that, under ! = !Nb, there only exists an RS such that
!t = !Nb for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Suppose on the contrary that !t 6= !Nb for
some t. Fixing such t and taking "  !t   !Nb, we have "i < 0 for some
i. To derive a contradiction, it su¢ ces to focus on exhaustive production
processes, that is,
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
fulllingAxt = !

t t and !t+1 =
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(I   A)xt + !t  Nb = xt + t  Nb for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Then, for t xed,
A!t+ = A

 
xt+ 1 + 

t+ 1
  A (Nb) = A 1!t+ 1   A 1 (I   A) t+ 1   A (Nb)
= A 1
 
xt+ 2 + 

t+ 2
  A 1 (Nb)  A 1 (I   A) t+ 1   A (Nb)
= A 2!t+ 2   A 1 (I + A) (Nb)  A 1 (I   A) t+ 1   A 2 (I   A) t+ 2
=    = !t   A
 
I + A+   + A 1 (Nb)   1X
k=0
Ak (I   A) t+k
= !Nb   A  I + A+   + A 1 (Nb) + "   1X
k=0
Ak (I   A) t+k
= A
 
I + A+ A2 +     (Nb)  A  I + A+   + A 1 (Nb) + "   1X
k=0
Ak (I   A) t+k
= A+1
 
I + A+ A2 +     (Nb) + " = A!Nb + "   1X
k=0
Ak (I   A) t+k.
Since (I   A) is nonsingular, At ! 0 as t ! 1, so that there exists a suf-
ciently large  such that
 
A!Nb

i
+ "i < 0 for i concerned here. Then,
as
P 1
k=0A
k (I   A) + (I   A) 1 (I   A) for su¢ ciently large  , we haveP 1
k=0A
k (I   A) t+k =
P 1
k=0A
k (I   A)  () where  ()   j ()j=1;:::;n
with j ()  min05h5 1

jt+h
	
for each commodity j = 1; : : : ; n. Thus,
A!t+ = A
!Nb+" P 1k=0Ak (I   A) t+k 5 A!Nb+" P 1k=0Ak (I   A)  ()
and  P 1k=0Ak (I   A)  +   () for the su¢ ciently large  . Therefore,
A!t+ 5 A!Nb+" 
P 1
k=0A
k (I   A)  () and  A!Nb
i
+"i i () < 0.
This implies !t+ 62 Rn+, which is a contradiction.
We next conrm that conditions (b) and (c) of Denition 1 hold for t = 1 if
and only if x1 = (I   A) 1 (Nb). Indeed, condition (b) implies x1+1 = Nb+
!2, which implies (I   A)x1 + !Nb = Nb+ !2 = Nb+ !Nb by ! = !Nb and
!2 = !Nb. Therefore, (I   A)x1 = Nb, which implies x1 = (I   A) 1 (Nb).
Moreover, if x1  (I   A) 1 (Nb), then Ax1  A (I   A) 1 (Nb) = !Nb by
the indecomposability of A. Thus, it violates condition (c) by ! = !Nb.
Therefore, x1 = (I   A) 1 (Nb) must hold.
Moreover x1 = (I   A) 1 (Nb) yields !2 = !Nb, so that the same ar-
gument applies to xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb), inductively. In conclusion, any
RS allocation meets xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb), t = 0, and !t+1 = !Nb for all
t = 1; 2; : : :.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Note that f(xt ; !t )gTt=1 meets all of the constraints in (MP T ) since a
catching-up optimal path
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
is possible, i.e., satises (1)(4).
Suppose on the contrary that
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	T
t=1
is not a solution to (MP T )
for some T . For this T , there exists another solution,
 
x0t ; 
0
t ; !
0
t+1
	T
t=1
,
which implies
PT
t=1 Lx
0
t <
PT
t=1 Lx

t . Let us take
 
x0t ; 
0
t ; !
0
t+1
	1
t=T+1
such that x0t = x

t , 
0
t = 

t , and !
0
t+1 = !

t+1 for t = T + 1; T + 2; : : :, which
is possible by pTAxT+1 = pT!

T+1 = pT!
0
T+1. Then,
 
x0t ; 
0
t ; !
0
t+1
	1
t=1
catches up to
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
, i.e.,
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt ) =
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt ) < 0;
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. Since pt = (1 + rt) pt 1A + wtL > 0 and wt = (1 + rt)wt 1 for t =
1; 2; : : : ; T ,
w0L =
pT   (1 + rT ) pT 1AQT
t=1 (1 + rt)
=
pT 1   (1 + rT 1) pT 2AQT 1
t=1 (1 + rt)
=    = p1   (1 + r1) p0A
1 + r1
:
Let
 
x0t; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
	T
t=1
be any plan satisfying all of the constraints in (MP T ).
Then, constraint (1) for t = 1 yields that p0Ax01 + p0
0
1 = p0!

1 = p0Ax

1.
Given that constraint (3) holds with equality, the constraints (1) and (3) for
t = 1; 2; : : : ; T   1 imply that
ptx
0
t + pt
0
t = ptb+ pt!
0
t+1
= ptb+ ptAx
0
t+1 + pt
0
t+1 ,
while for t = T ,
pTx
0
T + pT 
0
T = pT b+ pT!
0
T+1
= pT b+ pT!

T+1 .
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Therefore,
pt (x
0
t   xt ) = (ptx0t   ptb)  (ptxt   ptb)
= ptAx
0
t+1   ptAxt+1 + pt0t+1   pt0t for each t = 1; 2; : : : ; T   1;
pT (x
0
T   xT ) = (pTx0T   pT b)  (pTxT   pT b) = pT!0T+1   pt!T+1   pT 0T =  pT 0T .
Then,
w0L
TX
t=1
(x0t   xt ) =
TX
t=1

pt   (1 + rt) pt 1AQt
=1 (1 + r )
(x0t   xt )

=  p0A (x01   x1) +
T 1X
t=1
"
pt (x
0
t   xt )  ptA
 
x0t+1   xt+1
Qt
=1 (1 + r )
#
+
pT (x
0
T   xT )QT
t=1 (1 + rt)
=
TX
t=1

(1 + rt) pt 1   ptQt
=1 (1 + r )
0t

= 0 (9)
holds for any f0tgTt=1  Rn+, as p0 = p0A + w0L yields (1 + rt) pt 1   pt = 0
by Proposition 3(i). Therefore, f(xt ;0; Axt )gTt=1 constitutes a solution to
(MP T ).
Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. Focusing on (9), we obtain that the possible path f(xt ;0; Axt )g1t=1
meets lim infT!1 L
PT
t=1 (x
0
t   xt ) = 0 for any fx0tg1t=1 2 x (!1).
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. (i): Dening r  lim supt!1 rt, we let r < R. We notice that for
any " > 0, there exists t0 such that 1 + rt < 1 + r + " for all t = t0. Then,Qt
=t0+1
(1+r )
(1+r+")t t0 is decreasing with respect to t and converges to 0 as t!1, so
that for a su¢ ciently large T0 = t0,QT0
=t0+1
(1 + r )
(1 + r + ")T0 t0
<
(1 + r + ")t0Qt0
=1 (1 + r )
,
T0Y
=1
(1 + r ) < (1 + r + ")
T0 ;
which yields
Qt
=1 (1 + r ) < (1 + r + ")
t for all t = T0. Thus, for any
" 2 (0; R  r), we can take T0 such that t = T0 implies
Qt
=1 (1 + r )A
t 1 <
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(1 + r + ")tAt 1. By the choice of " 2 (0; R  r), Qt=1 (1 + r )At 1 <
(1 + r + ")tAt 1 ! 0 as t ! 1 (e.g., Meyer, 2000, 7.10.5). Recall (7)
in the proof of Proposition 3. Then, it follows that the right-hand side of (7)
converges to the zero vector, which implies limt!1 [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt] = 0.
(ii): Dening r  lim inft!1 rt, we let r > R. By an argument simi-
lar to the above, there exists T0 such that t = T0 implies
Qt
=1 (1 + r ) >
(1 + r   ")t for any " > 0. Then, for each i,
lim inf
t!1
"
tY
=1
(1 + r ) (p0   p0A  w0L)At 1
#
i
= sup
">0
lim inf
t!1

(1 + r   ")t (p0   p0A  w0L)At 1

i
= lim inf
t!1

(1 + r)t (p0   p0A  w0L)At 1

i
= (1 + r) (p0   p0A  w0L) lim inf
t!1

[(1 + r)A]t 1
	
i
:
We know from r > R that each entry of [(1 + r)A]t diverges as t!1 (e.g.,
Meyer, 2000, 7.10.33), so that the rightmost side of the above inequality
diverges. Recalling (7) again, we then have limt!1 [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]i = 1
for all i = 1; : : : ; n. This completes the proof.
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7 Addendum
7.1 E¢ ciency
This subsection shows the welfare properties of RSs. In particular, any equi-
librium allocation associated with an RS (an RS-allocation) starting from
any initial aggregate endowments of material input goods, !, which may dif-
fer from the minimally necessary capital stock, !Nb, is shown to be Pareto
e¢ cient, and moreover the associated path of aggregate capital accumulation
f!t+1g1t=1 converges to !Nb even though ! 6= !Nb.
To simplify the notation, we denote the elements of aggregate plans by
xt 
P
2N x

t , t 
P
2N 

t , and !t+1 
P
2N !

t+1 for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Then,
Denition A.1: For an economy, hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i, an allocation  (xt )2N ; t; !t+1	1t=1
is feasible (from !) if it satises, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, that
(a) Lxt 2 [0; 1] for every  2 N ;
(b) (I   A)xt + !t = Nb+ !t+1; and
(c) Axt + t = !t.
Denition A.2: For an economy, hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i, a feasible allocation 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
is Pareto e¢ cient (in terms of the catching-up cri-
terion from !) if any feasible allocation
 
(x0t )2N ; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
	1
t=1
satises the
following:
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt) = 0:
For convenience, let
  (!t) 

(xt; t; !t+1) 2 R3n+ j (a), (b), & (c) of Denition A.1
	
;
which is closed in the product topology. The following proposition provides
the characterization of all Pareto e¢ cient allocations under ! = !Nb:
Proposition A.1: Given an economy hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i, let ! = !Nb. Then,
a feasible allocation
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if
it satises Lxt = Nvb for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
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Proof. Let
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
be feasible for hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with ! =
!Nb. Under ! = !Nb, we can apply the argument in the proof of Proposition
4 to show that any allocation
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
is feasible in the sense
of the conditions (a), (b), and (c) of Denition A.1 if and only if xt =
(I   A) 1 (Nb) with Lxt 2 [0; 1] ( 2 N ); t = 0; and !t+1 = !Nb for all
t = 1; 2; : : :. This is because the conditions of Denition A.1 are identical
to the conditions for RS allocations, except for the catching up optimality
condition. Note that, by L (I   A) 1 (Nb) < N , there exists a prole (xt )2N
such that Lxt 2 [0; 1] ( 2 N ) for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Thus, by such a characterization, it follows that for any feasible allocation 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
, Lxt = Nvb holds for all t = 1; 2; : : :, which implies
that any feasible allocation is Pareto e¢ cient in terms of the catching-up
criterion.
To consider the characterization of all Pareto e¢ cient allocations under
the case of !  !Nb and !  !Nb +Nb, we prove the following two lemmas:
Lemma I:Given an economy hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with !Nb  !  !Nb+Nb, let 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
be a feasible allocation. Suppose that there exists
T < 1 such that !T = !Nb. If
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
is Pareto e¢ cient,
then it satises
PT 1
t=1 Lxt = TNvb   v
 
!   !Nb and Lxt = Nvb for all
t = R.
Proof. Let !Nb  !  !Nb+Nb and let  (xt )2N ; t; !t+1	1t=1 be a feasible
path. Note that x1 = 0 cannot be feasible by !  !Nb + Nb, and therefore
Lx1 > 0 holds. Suppose that there exists T <1 such that !T = !Nb. Then,
xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb); t = 0; and !t+1 = !Nb must hold for all t = T , by the
same argument as the proof of Proposition A.1.
Fix T <1 and consider the following program:
min
f(xt;t;!t+1)gTt=1
TX
t=1
Lxt; s.t.
8t = 1; 2; : : : ; T; Axt + t = !t;
Lxt 5 N ; (I   A)xt + !t = Nb+ !t+1;
!T+1 = !
Nb; !1  ! given:
(MPT )
Let
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	T
t=1
be the solution to the program (MPT ) and dene a
allocation
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
such that xt  (I   A) 1 (Nb); t  0; and
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!t+1  !Nb for t = T + 1; T + 2; : : :. Note that
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
satises
the conditions (b) and (c) of Denition A.1. Then,
 
(xt )2N ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
with
P
2N x

t = x

t (t = 1; 2; : : :) is feasible if and only if for every  2
N , Lxt 2 [0; 1] for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Now, we can prove that if a feasi-
ble path
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
with !T = !Nb is Pareto e¢ cient, then  P
2N x

t

; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
with !T+1 = !Nb is a solution to (MPT ).
To this end, suppose not: a Pareto e¢ cient path
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
,
with !T+1 = !Nb, does not constitutes a solution to (MPT ). Note that
because of feasibility, it satises all the constraints in (MPT ) for any t 5 T
and xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb); t = 0; and !t+1 = !Nb for any t > T , as we
have seen. Since f(xt; t; !t+1)gTt=1 cannot be the solution to (MPT ) under
!T+1 = !
Nb, we have
PT
t=1 Lxt >
PT 1
t=1 Lx

t . Then,
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lxt   Lxt) =
TX
t=1
Lxt  
TX
t=1
Lxt < 0;
which contradicts the Pareto e¢ ciency of
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
.
Finally, we demonstrate that
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
has the above form
of
 
(xt )2N ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
if and only if it satises
PT
t=1 Lxt = TNvb  
v
 
!   !Nb and Lxt = Nvb for all t > T . By its construction,  (xt )2N ; t; !t+1	1t=1
satises Lxt = Nvb for all t > T , and conversely, Lxt 6= Nvb for some
t > T violates the feasibility of
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
. Moreover, since
f(xt; t; !t+1)gTt=1 is the solution to (MPT ), it satises the constraints of
(MPT ) with equality under the minimization, i.e., (I   A)xt+!t = Nb+!t+1
for any t 5 T . We have, from the summation with respect to t, thatPT
t=1 xt = T (I   A) 1 (Nb)   (I   A) 1
 
!   !Nb. Then, the solution to
(MPT ), f(xt; t; !t+1)gTt=1 satises
PT
t=1 Lxt = TNvb   v
 
!   !Nb. This
completes the proof.
Lemma II: Given an economy hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with !Nb  !  !Nb +Nb,
let
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
be a Pareto e¢ cient allocation. Then, it satisesP1
t=1 (Lxt  Nvb) =  v
 
!   !Nb and limt!1 Lxt = Nvb if and only if it
fullls limt!1 !t = !Nb.
Proof. Let !Nb  !  !Nb + Nb. Note rst that a Pareto e¢ cient path 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
satises the condition (b) of Denition A.1 with
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equality for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Suppose, contrarily, that there exists a Pareto
e¢ cient path
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
such that (I   A)xT+!T  Nb+!T+1
for some T < 1. Then, taking "T  0 with (I   A)xT   "T + !T = Nb +
!T+1 and setting x0T  xT   (I   A) 1 "T , we can construct a feasible path 
(x0t )2N ; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
	1
t=1
such that x0t  xt for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T   1; T + 1; : : :.
Since x0T < xT by "T  0 and (I   A) 1 > 0, we have, from L > 0, that
Lx0T < LxT and
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lx0t   Lxt) = (Lx0T   LxT ) < 0;
which contradicts the Pareto e¢ ciency of
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
. This im-
plies that any Pareto e¢ cient path satises condition (b) of Denition A.1
with equality for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Thus, taking t  !t   !Nb = 0 (t =
1; 2; : : :), we can denote any Pareto e¢ cient path
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
by xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb t +t+1) and t = (I   A) 1 (t   At+1) for
t = 1; 2; : : :. We notice from x1 = (I   A) 1
 
Nb  ! + !Nb +2

that for a
period T <1,
TX
t=1
Lxt = TNvb  v
 
!   !Nb+ vT+1:
For the ifpart, let limt!1 !t = !Nb. Then, we have from limt!1 vt =
0 in (A1) that
P1
t=1 (Lxt  Nvb) =  v
 
!   !Nb. Since   (!) is closed in the
product topology, limt!1
 
x0t; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
 2   (!) with limt!1 !0t = !Nb implies
limt!1 x0t = (I   A) 1 (Nb), and therefore, limt!1 Lxt = Nvb. To show the
only ifpart, we suppose conversely that it violates limt!1 !t = !Nb, i.e.,
lim supt!1 !it > !
Nb
i for some i, where !it and !
Nb
i are respectively the i-th
element of !t and !Nb. Then, we have from (A1) and v > 0 that
lim sup
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lxt  Nvb) =  v
 
!   !Nb+ lim sup
T!1
vT >  v
 
!   !Nb ;
which contradicts
P1
t=1 (Lxt  Nvb) =  v
 
!   !Nb. This completes the
proof.
Proposition A.2: Given an economy hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i, let !Nb  ! 
!Nb + Nb. Then, a feasible allocation
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
is Pareto
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e¢ cient if and only if it satises
P1
t=1 (Lxt  Nvb) =  v
 
!   !Nb and
limt!1 Lxt = Nvb.
Proof. Let !Nb  !  !Nb+Nb. We rst show the only ifpart. To see this,
suppose, contrarily, that a Pareto e¢ cient path
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
vi-
olates
P1
t=1 (Lxt  Nvb) =  v
 
!   !Nb or limt!1 Lxt = Nvb. By Lemma
II, this is equivalent to the violation of limt!1 !t = !Nb, i.e., lim supt!1 !it >
!Nbi for some commodity i. As we have seen in the proof of Lemma II, 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
satises (b) of Denition A.1 with equality for all
t = 1; 2; : : : by its Pareto e¢ ciency. Then, taking t  !t   !Nb  0
(t = 1; 2; : : :), we have (A1). Let x1  (I   A) 1
 
Nb  ! + !Nb and
1  !   Ax1 = (I   A) 1
 
!   !Nb. Dene a path  xt ; t ; !t+1	1t=1
such that xt  (I   A) 1 (Nb); t  0; and !t+1  !Nb for t = 2; 3; : : :.
As in the proof of Lemma I, it is feasible if and only if for every  2 N ,
Lxt 2 [0; 1] for all t = 1; 2; : : :. For a period T < 1, we have from the
summation with respect to t that
TX
t=1
Lxt =
TX
t=1
Nvb  v  !   !Nb :
Then, we obtain from t  0 for all t = 1; 2; : : :, that
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lxt   Lxt) = lim inf
T!1
( vT+1) < 0:
Note that since lim supt!1 !it  !Nbi for some i, this inequality holds. This
contradicts the Pareto e¢ ciency of
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
, which completes
the proof of the only ifpart.
To show the ifpart, we will consider all admissible feasible paths. Note
that since a feasible path
 
(xt )2N ; t; !t+1
	1
t=1
satises !t = !Nb for
all t = 2; 3; : : :, it exactly fullls one of the following two cases: either (I)
!t  !Nb holds for all t = 2; 3; : : :; or (II) there exists  < 1 such that
!t  !Nb for any t 5  and !t = !Nb for any t >  . For the case of (I), let 
(x0t )2N ; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
	1
t=1
be a feasible path such that
P1
t=1 (Lx
0
t  Nvb) =
 v  !   !Nb and limt!1 Lx0t = Nvb. For the case of (II), note that,
any Pareto e¢ cient path satises
P
t=1 Lxt = Nvb   v
 
!   !Nb and
Lxt = Nvb for all t >  , by Lemma I. Let
 
(x00t )2N ; 
00
t ; !
00
t+1
	1
t=1
satisfy
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P
t=1 Lx
00
t = Nvb v
 
!   !Nb and Lx00t = Nvb (t > ) in case (II). Then, it
su¢ ces to check that
 
(x0t )2N ; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
	1
t=1
and
 
(x00t )2N ; 
00
t ; !
00
t+1
	1
t=1
are equivalent in terms of the catching-up optimality. By a calculation similar
to that above, we have, for any T >  ,
TX
t=1
(Lxt   Lx0t) =  v0T+1:
Then, we obtain from limt!10t = 0 that
lim inf
T!1
TX
t=1
(Lxt   Lx0t) = lim inf
T!1
  v0T+1 =   lim
T!1
v0T+1 = 0;
which completes the proof.
Using the characterizations of Pareto e¢ cient allocations, we now show
the rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics in terms of RSs.
Proposition A.3: Given an economy

N ; (A;L) ; u; (!1)2N with !Nb 5
!  !Nb + Nb, let
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
be an RS allocation associated
with

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )2N
	1
t=1
. Then, it is Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. Let
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
be an RS allocation. We rstly prove
that xt > 0 for all t = 1; 2; : : :. To show this, we x t and, suppose on the con-
trary that xit = 0 for some commodity i. Note that, for any t, x

t = 0 cannot
be an RS activity by ! 6= !Nb+Nb. Since xt = (I   A) 1
 
Nb+ !t+1   !t + "

for a suitable " 2 Rn+ by (b) of Denition 1, the supposition of xit = 0
implies Nb + !t+1   !t + " = 0 by (I   A) 1 > 0. This contradicts to
xt  0. Then, xt > 0 for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Fixing t arbitrarily, we have
that for each commodity i, there exists  2 N such that xit > 0. We
then notice that pit = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1Aei + w

t Li for i satisfying x

it > 0,
where ei is the i-th unit vector. Indeed, pit < (1 + r

t ) p

t 1Aei + w

t Li (8i)
or pit > (1 + r

t ) p

t 1Aei + w

t Li (8i) necessarily violates constraint (4).
Moreover, if pit < (1 + r

t ) p

t 1Aei + w

t Li for some i, then fullling (4)
implies pjt > (1 + r

t ) p

t 1Aej +w

t Lj for some j satisfying x

jt > 0. Taking
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x0t  xt such that x0it < xit and x0jt < xjt to meet (4), and choosing a suit-
able 0t , we can construct a possible allocation at t,
 
x0t ; 
0
t ; !

t+1

, which is a
contradiction to s optimality. We thus have pit = (1 + r

t ) p

t 1Aei+w

t Li
for i satisfying xit > 0.
We now suppose contrarily that it is not Pareto e¢ cient. This is equiv-
alent to lim supt!1 !

it > !
Nb
i for some commodity i, by Lemma II and
Proposition A.2. Note that, for each t = 2; 3; : : :, we can take i (t) 2
i j !it   !Nbi = !jt   !Nbj ;8j
	
. Setting0i(t)  maxi

!it   !Nbi j i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
	
>
0 for each t = 2; 3; : : :, we have lim inft!10i(t) > 0, which implies inft
0
i(t) >
0. (Indeed, if inft0i(t) = 0, then 
0
i(t) = 0 for some t, which is a con-
tradiction.) Taking "i(1) 2

0; mini vi
maxi vi
inft
0
i(t)

and inductively dening
"i(t+1)  vi(t)vi(t+1) "i(t) for t = 1; 2; : : :, we have that for any t,
"i(t+1) =
vi(t)
vi(t+1)
"i(t) =
vi(t)
vi(t+1)
vi(t 1)
vi(t)
"i(t 1)
=    = vi(1)
vi(t+1)
"i(1)
<
vi(1)
vi(t+1)
mini vi
maxi vi
inf
t
0i(t)
5 inf
t
0i(t):
Then, we obtain !i(t)   "i(t) > !Nbi(t) and vi(t)"i(t) = vi(t+1)"i(t+1) for all t =
2; 3; : : :.
Setting "t  "i(t)tei(t) (t = 2; 3; : : :), and taking !0t  !t   "t (t =
2; 3; : : :); x01  (I   A) 1 (Nb  ! + !02); x0t  (I   A) 1
 
Nb  !0t + !0t+1

(t = 2; 3; : : :); 01  ! Ax01; and 0t  !t Ax0t (t = 2; 3; : : :), we construct a
path
 
x0t; 
0
t; !
0
t+1
	1
t=1
satisfying the feasibility conditions (b) and (c) of De-
nition A.1. Note that it is Pareto superior to
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
, since
x01 = (I   A) 1 (Nb  ! + !2) (I   A) 1 "2 < x1 and Lx0t = v
 
Nb  !t + !t+1

+
v ("t   "t+1) 5 Lxt +
 
vi(t)"i(t)   vi(t+1)"i(t+1)

= Lxt (t = 2; 3; : : :) by the
construction. Then, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, there exists a suitable assignment 
x0t ; 
0
t ; !
0
t+1

2N such that: x
0
t 5 xt for any  2 N and x0t  xt for
some  2 N ; p001 = p0!1   p0Ax0 and p1!02 = p1x01 + p101   p1b; and
pt 1
0
t = p

t 1!

t  pt 1Ax0 and pt!0t+1 = ptx0t+pt 0t  pt b for all t = 2; 3; : : :.
This implies that for each  2 N ,
n 
x0t ; 
0
t ; !
0
t+1

2N
o1
t=1
meets the con-
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straints of (1)(3). Moreover, since pit = (1 + r

t ) p

it 1Aei+w

t Li for  2 N
satisfying xit > 0 as noted above, it also meets constraint (4). By the con-
struction, this assignment contradicts the claim that fxt g1t=1 is catching-up
optimal for every  2 N .
By Lemma II, Propositions A.2 and A.3, any RSs in world economies with
the leisure preference should approach to the minimally necessary capital
stock in the innite limit of time, i.e., !t ! !Nb as t!1.
7.2 Existence
This section proves the existence of an imperfectly specialized IRS for the
pre-industrial world economies analyzed in the paper. The proof shows the
consistency of the formal framework and establishes that the impossibility
result on the persistent UE free trade equilibria characterized in Theorem 2
and Corollary 4 does not hold vacuously.
For the existence of RSs with non-stationary relative prices of commodi-
ties, we rst provide suitable conditions for ruling out a kind of factor-
intensity reversal,and thereby nd tractable price paths.21 Let q be the left-
hand side Perron-Frobenius eigenvector associated with the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue of A, 1
1+R
. Dene ~p0 (&0)  &0q + w0v for &0 > 0.
Lemma III:Take p0 = ~p0 (&0) for an arbitrary &0 > 0, and let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 =
p (p0; w0; r) for r  R+. Then, (1 + rt) pt 1   pt = &0R
Qt
=1
 
1+r
1+R

q for all
t = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. Let p0 = &0q+w0v. Note that v = L (I   A) 1 = L+L (I   A) 1A =
L+ vA. Then, fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) yields
p1 = (1 + r1) (p0A+ w0L)
= (1 + r1) [(&0q + w0v)A+ w0L]
= (1 + r1)

&0
1 +R
q + w0v

;
21The standard Heckscher-Ohlin model traditionally assumes no factor-intensity reversal
for the analysis, in order to ensure factor price equalization.
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so that
(1 + r1) p0   p1 = (1 + r1)

&0q + w0v  

&0
1 +R
q + w0v

= &0R
1 + r1
1 +R
q:
Moreover, supposing (1 + rt) pt 1   pt = &0R
Qt
=1
 
1+r
1+R

q for any t, we
obtain from (7) in the proof of Proposition 3 that
(1 + rt+1) pt   pt+1 = (1 + rt+1) [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]A
=
1 + rt+1
1 +R
[(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]
= &0R
t+1Y
=1

1 + r
1 +R

q:
This completes the proof.
By Proposition 3-(ii) and Corollary 2, if L = &q for some & > 0, then the
price vector ~p0 (&0) in Lemma III becomes the labor-value pricing and the
stationary relative prices of commodities. As our subject here is to examine
the existence of RSs with non-stationary relative prices of commodities, we
assume L 6= &q for any & > 0.
Note that if L 6= &q > 0, then vAei
Li
6= vAej
Lj
for some i; j. Indeed, otherwise
vAei
Li
=
vAej
Lj
holds for any (i; j), which is equivalent to L = &vA for some
& > 0. Then, by the Neumann series (I   A) 1 =P1=0A ,
L = &vA = &L (I   A) 1A = &LA (I   A) 1 , L = (1 + &)LA;
so that L > 0 is the eigenvector for A and must be the unique (up to scalar)
Perron-Frobenius vector by the indecomposability of A. This contradicts
L 6= &q for any & > 0.
We additionally have the following observation.
Lemma IV: Suppose that (A;L) satises vAei
Li
6= vAek
Lk
for some i; k =
1; : : : ; n. Take p0 = ~p0 (&0) for &0 > 0, and let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r)
for r  R+. Then, there exists a commodity j for any t = 1; 2; : : :, such
that ptAei
ptAej
= pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)ej for all i and
ptAei
ptAej
> pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)ej for some i
, by setting
a su¢ ciently small &0 > 0.
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Proof. By Lemma III, taking p0 = &0q + w0v yields (1 + rt) pt 1   pt =
&0R
Qt
=1
 
1+r
1+R

q, so that
pt (I   A) = [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]A+
tY
=1
(1 + r )w0L
=
tY
=1
(1 + r )

&0R
(1 +R)t
qA+ w0L

:
(A3)
Moreover, since 1
1+R
q = qA is equivalent to q = RqA (I   A) 1,
ptA =
tY
=1
(1 + r )

&0R
(1 +R)t
qA (I   A) 1 + v

A
=
tY
=1
(1 + r )

&0
(1 +R)t
qA+ vA

:
(A4)
Dene J 
n
j j 8i; vAei
Li
= vAej
Lj
o
, and take (i; j) for i 62 J and j 2 J .
Then, vAeiLj > vAejLi. We have from (A3) and (A4) that
p1Aei
p1Aej
  p1 (I   A) ei
p1 (I   A) ej
=
&0
1+R
qAei + vAei
&0
1+R
qAej + vAej
 
&0R
1+R
qAei + Li
&0R
1+R
qAej + Lj
=
&0
1+R
qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej] + (vAeiLj   vAejLi) 
&0
1+R
qAej + vAej
  
&0R
1+R
qAej + Lj
 :
By taking a su¢ ciently small &0 > 0, we can set the rst term of the nu-
merator to be negligible for the second term, vAeiLj   vAejLi > 0. Then,
p1Aei
p1Aej
> p1(I A)ei
p1(I A)ej for i 62 J and j 2 J .
Inductively, suppose ptAei
ptAej
> pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)ej (i 62 J; j 2 J) for t = 1. Since
0 <
ptAei
ptAej
  pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) ej =
&0
(1+R)t
qAei + vAei
&0
(1+R)t
qAej + vAej
 
&0R
(1+R)t
qAei + Li
&0R
(1+R)t
qAej + Lj
=
&0
(1+R)t
qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej] + (vAeiLj   vAejLi)h
&0
(1+R)t
qAej + vAej
i h
&0R
(1+R)t
qAej + Lj
i ,
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it follows that
vAeiLj   vAejLi >   &0
(1 +R)t
qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej]
>   &0
(1 +R)t+1
qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej] ,
even in the case where qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej] < 0 holds.
Therefore, in any case of qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej] T 0, we
have
pt+1Aei
pt+1Aej
  pt+1 (I   A) ei
pt+1 (I   A) ej
=
&0
(1+R)t+1
qA [(Lj  RvAej) ei   (Li  RvAei) ej] + (vAeiLj   vAejLi)h
&0
(1+R)t+1
qAej + vAej
i h
&0R
(1+R)t+1
qAej + Lj
i > 0.
By the construction, vAeiLj = vAejLi for i; j 2 J . Note that there exists
j 2 J such that for any j 2 J , qA [(Lj  RvAej) ej   (Lj  RvAej) ej ] =
0. Then, it holds that for any t = 1; 2; : : :,
ptAej
ptAej
  pt (I   A) ej
pt (I   A) ej =
&0
(1+R)t
qA [(Lj  RvAej) ej   (Lj  RvAej) ej ]h
&0
(1+R)t
qAej + vAej
i h
&0R
(1+R)t
qAej + Lj
i = 0:
This completes the proof.
Without loss of generality, let the commodity j in Lemma IV be renum-
bered as n, so that
vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i 6= n, and vAei
Li
>
vAen
Ln
for some i.
Then, Lemma IV implies that for every t = 1; 2; : : :,
ptAei
ptAen
= pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) en for i 6= n, and
ptAei
ptAen
>
pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) en for some i:
As vA means the labor values of capital goods, this numbering makes the
n-th commodity the most labor-intensive under the labor-value pricing.
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The next lemma characterizes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
preserving the non-reversal of factor-intensity through the innite limit of
time. Such a condition is given by qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
for i 6= n as follows:
LemmaV: Take p0 = ~p0 (&0) for an arbitrary &0 > 0, and let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 =
p (p0; w0; r) for r  R+. Then, the following are equivalent: for i = 1; : : : ; n 
1,
(i) qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
;
(ii) pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en >
pt+1(I A)ei
pt+1(I A)en for all t = 1; 2; : : : ;
(iii) pt(I A)ei
Li
> pt(I A)en
Ln
for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. (i) , (ii): Fix t arbitrarily. We have from (A3) that, for any i 6= n,
pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) en >
pt+1 (I   A) ei
pt+1 (I   A) en
,
&0R
(1+R)t
qAei + w0Li
&0R
(1+R)t
qAen + w0Ln
>
&0R
(1+R)t+1
qAei + w0Li
&0R
(1+R)t+1
qAen + w0Ln
, &0R
2w0
(1 +R)t+1
(qAeiLn   qAenLi) > 0:
Then, pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en >
pt+1(I A)ei
pt+1(I A)en for all t = 1; 2; : : :, if and only if qAeiLn >
qAenLi.
(i) , (iii): Similarly, (A3) yields that for any i 6= n,
pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) en >
Li
Ln
,
&0R
(1+R)t
qAei + w0Li
&0R
(1+R)t
qAen + w0Ln
>
Li
Ln
, &0Rw0
(1 +R)t
(qAeiLn   qAenLi) > 0:
Then, pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en >
Li
Ln
for all t = 1; 2; : : :, if and only if qAeiLn > qAenLi.
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Given (A;L) with qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
and vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n   1, and
vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some i. For p0 = ~p0 (&0) > 0; w0 > 0; r  R+, let us take
fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = p (p0; w0; r) such that for each t = 1; 2; : : : ;
ptAei
ptAen
= pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) en >
pt+1 (I   A) ei
pt+1 (I   A) en for i 6= n;
ptAei
ptAen
>
pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) en for some i.
Denote such fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 by ~p (p0; w0; r). Note that ~p (p0; w0; r) is well-
dened whenever p0 = ~p0 (&0) by Lemmas IV and V.
Lemma III shows that

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
(from !) may be an RS allo-
cation. Such an allocation naturally meets constraints (1) and (3). We now
check whether it satises the labor hours constraint (2), i.e., Lxt 2 (0; 1]
(8 2 N ; 8t = 1; 2; : : :). To this end, x arbitrarily t = 1; 2; : : :. Since
wt =
Qt
=1 (1 + r )w0 and pt = (1 + rt) pt 1A + wtL with the arbitrage-free
condition (1 + rt) pt 1   pt = 0, we have that, for any xt 2 Rn+ fullling
pt (I   A)xt = ptb,
tY
=1
(1 + r )w0Lx

t = ptb  [(1 + rt) pt 1   pt]Axt 5 ptb:
which derives from pt =
Qt
=1 (1 + r ) p0A
t +
Qt
=1 (1 + r )w0L
Pt
=0A
 .
Then,
Lxt 5
ptbQt
=1 (1 + r )w0
=
p0
w0
Atb+ L
tX
=0
Ab: (A5)
Thus, for !1 2 Rn+, a path fxt g1t=1 with Lxt 2 (0; 1] (8t = 1; 2; : : :) is
guaranteed by
p0
w0
Atb+ L
tX
=0
Ab 5 1; (A6)
for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Since it may not be easy to evaluate the left-hand side of
(A6) at any period t, we will suggest a simple su¢ cient condition for (A6).
Lemma VI: Suppose that (A;L; b) satises b = Ab and (v + LA) b < 1.
For an arbitrary w0 > 0, take p0 > 0 such that
p0
w0
= v + ", where " is a
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1  n nonnegative vector such that "Ab 5 1   (v + L) b. Then, it meets
(A6) without equality for all t = 1; 2; : : :, so that any fxt g1t=1  Rn+ with
pt (I   A)xt = ptb (8t = 1; 2; : : :) fullls Lxt 2 (0; 1) for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. By the supposition of 1   (v + LA) b > 0, we can take a su¢ ciently
small number &0 > 0 with "  &0q such that "Ab 5 1  (v + LA) b holds. Let
"  &0q
w0
and p0
w0
 v + " for an arbitrary w0 > 0. Then,
p0   p0A = w0 (v + ") (I   A) = w0v (I   A) + w0" (I   A) = w0L+ w0&0q (I   A)
> w0L
as q (I   A) = R
1+R
q > 0. In this case, by the construction of " and p0,
p0
w0
Ab+ L (I + A) b = vAb+ "Ab+ Lb+ LAb = vb+ LAb+ "Ab 5 1.
Therefore, (A6) is satised for t = 1. Moreover, by the supposition of b = Ab,
it follows that for any t = 1; 2; : : :,"
p0
w0
At 1 + L
t 1X
=0
A
#
b 
"
p0
w0
At + L
tX
=0
A
#
b
=
p0
w0
At 1 (I   A) b+ L
t 1X
=0
Ab 
 
L
t 1X
=0
Ab+ LAtb
!
=

p0
w0
At 1 (I   A)  LAt

b =

p0
w0
(I   A)At 1   LAt

b =

p0
w0
(I   A)  LA

At 1b
> [v (I   A)  LA]At 1b (by p0
w0
 v + " with " > 0)
= L (I   A)At 1b = LAt 1 (I   A) b = 0.
This implies that for any t = 2; : : :,
p0
w0
Atb+ L
tX
=0
Ab 5 p0
w0
Ab+ L (I + A) b 5 1;
which implies that (A6) is satised for t = 2; : : :, and thus completes the
proof.
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Note that, for the pricing paths starting with p0 = ~p0 (&0) dened at the
beginning of this subsection, we can apply Lemma VI by taking a su¢ ciently
small &0 > 0. Indeed, it su¢ ces to set &0q 5 w0". Thus, the tractable
price paths ~p (p0; w0; r) satises
p0
w0
Ab+ vb 5 1 and so every s labor hours
constraint at every period.
We now prove the existence of RSs. Given ! = !Nb, let
X  (x)2N 2 RnN++ j Ax = !Nb (8 2 N ) and Lx 2 (0; 1)	 :
The following proposition establishes the existence of each nations catching-
up optimal paths for the suitable initial endowments prole (supposed to
exist, tentatively.)
Proposition A.4: Let hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with ! = !Nb be an economy sat-
isfying qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
, vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n   1, vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some
i, b = Ab, and (v + LA) b < 1. For w0 = 1 and an arbitrary r  R+,
take p0 such that p0Ab + L (I + A) b 5 1 and ~p (p0; 1; r) is well-dened,
and let fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = ~p (p0; 1; r). If there exist (!1)2N 2 RnN+ and
(x1)2N 2 X such that p0Ax1 = p0!1 and p1 (I   A)x1 = p1b for every
 2 N , then it constitutes (xt )2N	1t=1  X such that fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1) is
catching-up optimal for every  2 N . It thereby guarantees the existence of
RS allocations

(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
associated with fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1.
Proof. The suppositions, qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
and vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n   1,
vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some i, and b = Ab, and (v + LA) b < 1, ensure the existence
of p0 such that p0Ab + L (I + A) b 5 1 and ~p (p0; 1; r) is well-dened for an
arbitrary r  R, by Lemmas IVVI. Given fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = ~p (p0; 1; r),
we will show that for (xt )2N 2 X with pt (I   A)xt = ptb (8 2 N ), there
exists
 
xt+1

2N 2 X such that ptAxt+1 = ptAxt and pt+1 (I   A)xt+1 =
pt+1b (8 2 N ). First, by Lemma IV, ptAeiptAen =
pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en holds for i 6= n, and
ptAei
ptAen
> pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en holds for some i. This property and (x

t )2N 2 X  RnN++
together imply that, for any  2 N ,
ptAx

t
ptAen
=
n 1X
i=1

ptAei
ptAen
xit

+xnt >
n 1X
i=1

pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) enx

it

+xnt =
pt (I   A)xt
pt (I   A) en :
Then, since pt (I   A)xt = ptb, ptAeiptAen =
pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en for i 6= n, and
ptAei
ptAen
>
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pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en for some i, we have:
pt (I   A)xt
pt (I   A) en =
pt (I   A)x
pt (I   A) en =
n 1X
i=1

pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) enxi

+ xn
>
n 1X
i=1

pt+1 (I   A) ei
pt+1 (I   A) enxi

+ xn (by Lemma V)
=
pt+1b
pt+1 (I   A) en
for x  (I   A) 1 b with the i-th element xi, so that ptAx

t
ptAen
> pt+1b
pt+1(I A)en
for every  2 N . Dening x^t+1  ptAx

t
ptAen
en, we get ptAx^t+1 = ptAxt and
pt+1 (I   A) x^t+1 > pt+1b. For " > 0, there exists xt+1 2

y 2 Rn++ j ky   x^t+1k < "
	
such that ptAxt+1 = ptAxt and pt+1 (I   A)xt+1 = pt+1b, where kk is the
standard Euclidean norm. Then, the program (MP t+1) has a solution since
its domain is non-empty for xt 2 Rn++ with pt (I   A)xt = ptb.
Suppose that (!1)2N 2 RnN+ and (x1)2N 2 X fulll p0Ax1 = p0!1 and
p1 (I   A)x1 = p1b (8 2 N ). Then, for an arbitrary  2 N , there exists a
solution to the program (MP 1 ), x

1 2 Rn++ with !2  Ax1 , which meets
p1 (I   A)x1 = p1b. Inductively, for t = 2, we can apply Lemma 2 in order
to conclude that xt 1 2 Rn++ with pt 1 (I   A)xt 1 = pt 1b guarantees the
existence of a solution to the program (MP t ). Let us denote this solution
as xt 2 Rn++ with !t+1  Axt . Then, such xt further yields the existence
of xt+1 2 Rn++ with pt+1 (I   A)xt+1 = pt+1b. As p0Ab + vb 5 1 ensures
that pt (I   A)xt = ptb implies Lxt 2 (0; 1) (8t = 1; 2; : : :) by Lemma
VI, we have fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1). By Corollary 2, fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1), which is
constituted inductively as argued above, is catching-up optimal for  2 N ,
i.e., it satises the RS condition (a) of Denition 1. We note that this ap-
proach to constitute an catching-up optimal path fxt g1t=1 is still admissible
when

(xt )2N
	1
t=1
 X is additionally assumed. Then, we easily verify
the RS conditions (b) and (c) since Axt = !

t+1 (8 2 N ;8t = 1; 2; : : :) and
(xt )2N ;
 
xt+1

2N 2 X. This completes the proof.
Here, we consider conditions on the wealth prole that characterize the
initial endowments prole assumed in Proposition A.4. Given ! = !Nb,
we can take p0 such that p0 = p0A + L > 0 and 1p0!Nbp0Ab + vb 5 1.
Indeed, we have already argued that there exists p0 = ~p0 (&0), which is dened
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by taking a su¢ ciently small &0 > 0 in order to meet &0q 5 ", such that
p0 = p0A + L and p0Ab + vb 5 1 hold by Lemma VI. Moreover, by the
denition of !Nb = A (I   A) 1Nb, 1
p0!
Nbp0Ab < p0Ab holds.
Let pr1  (1 + r) p0A + (1 + r)L for r = 0. For each  2 [0; 1], we dene
the set
Xr ()  x 2 Rn+ j p0Ax = p0!Nb; pr1 (I   A)x = pr1b; Lx 2 (0; 1)	
with generic element xr (). Note thatXr () is non-empty for some  2 [0; 1],
since (I   A) 1 b 2 Xr   1
N

. Indeed, Axr
 
1
N

= A (I   A) 1 b = 1
N
!Nb
holds, so that
p0Ax
r () = p0Ax
r

1
N

=
1
N
p0!
Nb = p0!
Nb:
Also, (I   A)xr   1
N

= b implies pr1 (I   A)xr
 
1
N

= pr1b. Finally, L (I   A) 1 (Nb) 2
(0; N) implies 1
N
L (I   A) 1 (Nb) 2 (0; 1), so that
Lxr () = Lxr

1
N

= L (I   A) 1 b 2 (0; 1) :
Thus, Xr () 6= ? for some  2 [0; 1).
Note that Xr () is a compact set of Rn+ for any  2 [0; 1] since p0 > 0
and pr1 > 0. Then, we can take l
r ()  min fLxr () j xr () 2 Xr ()g for
each  2 [0; 1] satisfying Xr () 6= ?, so that lr () 2 (0; 1]. We dene
r  inf f 2 [0; 1] j lr () 2 (0; 1]g ;
where r > 0 by b > 0. We also dene   infr=0 r > 0. Then, consider the
set:
(W0) 
(
(W 0 )2N 2 RN++ j
X
2N
W 0 = 1; min
2N
W 0 > 
)
:
Moreover, let (!)  fp > 0 j p! = 1g.
Theorem A.1: Let hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with ! = !Nb be an economy satisfying
qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
and vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n   1, vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some i,
b = Ab, and (v + LA) b < 1. Let
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
satisfy Lxt = Nvb
for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Moreover, let (W 0 )2N 2 (W0) be a prole of initial
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wealth endowments. Then, there exist (p0; w

0) 2 (!)R++, r  R+, and
(!1 )2N 2 RnN+ satisfying p0!1 = W 0 by which
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
constitutes an RS with

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= ~p (p0; w

0; r
).
Proof. Let
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
satisfy Lxt = Nvb for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Propo-
sition A.1 implies that, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, any assignment (xt )2N 2 RnN+
satisfying
P
2N x

t = x

t and Lx

t 2 [0; 1] (8 2 N ) can constitute a
Pareto e¢ cient allocation. Note that xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb) and t = 0 for all
t = 1; 2; : : :. Then, x1 satises pAx

1 = p!
Nb and px1 = Npb + p!
Nb for any
p = 0 by an argument similar to the above case for xr
 
1
N
 2 Xr   1
N

.
Let (W 0 )2N 2 (W0). By the construction, there exists r = 0 such
that min2N W 0 = r, and there exists x (r) 2 Xr (r) with p0 satisfying
p0 = p0A+L > 0 and 1p0!Nbp0Ab+ vb 5 1, and p
r
1  (1 + r) p0A+ (1 + r)L.
Dene p0  1p0!Nbp0 2 
 
!Nb

. Then, there exists ()2N 2 RN++ such that 
!Nb

2N 2 RnN+ and W 0 = p0!Nb (8 2 N ), and thus, we can take
(!1 )2N 2 RnN+ such that p0!1 = W 0 (8 2 N ). For each  2 N , let
x1 2 Rn+ be a solution to:
min
x2Rn+
Lx; s.t. p0Ax = 
p0!
Nb = p0!

1 ; p

1 (I   A)x = p1b;
where p1  1p0!Nbp
r
1 = (1 + r) p

0A +
1
p0!
Nb (1 + r)L. As we have seen in
the proof of Proposition A.4, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, there exist (xt )2N and 
xt+1

2N 2 X such that prt 1Axt+1 = prt 1Axt and prt (I   A)xt = prt b
for

prt 1; (wt; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (pr0; 1; r
), where pr0  p0 and r  R+ starts with
r1 = r. Then, taking

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (p0; w

0; r
) for w0  1p0!Nb >
0, we obtain

(xt )2N
	1
t=1
 X such that p0Ax1 = p0!1 , ptAxt+1 =
ptAx

t , and p

t (I   A)xt = pt b for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Let
n 
t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
consist of t = 0 and !

t+1  Axt (8 2 N ;8t = 1; 2; : : :). Then,n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
constitutes an RS with

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
by Propo-
sition A.4 again.
Remark A.1: Note that in Theorem A1, there is no constraint on r  R+
except for the initial interest rate r1. Therefore, this theorem allows the
existence of an RS in which lim inft!1 rt > R holds.
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8 Alternative statements of Lemma VI and
Proposition A4
Lemma VI: Suppose that (A;L; b) satises v (I + A) b < 1. For an arbitrary
w0 > 0, take p0 > 0 such that
p0
w0
= v+", where " is a 1n nonnegative vector
such that "Ab 5 1  v (I + A) b. Then, it meets (A6) without equality for all
t = 1; 2; : : :, so that any fxt g1t=1  Rn+ with pt (I   A)xt = ptb (8t = 1; 2; : : :)
fullls Lxt 2 (0; 1) for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. By the supposition of 1  v (I + A) b > 0, we can take a 1 n vector
" = 0 (possibly nonzero) such that "Ab 5 1   v (I + A) b. Putting p0 
w0 (v + ") for an arbitrary w0 > 0, we have p0 = p0A+w0L > p0A following
from L > 0. By the construction of " and p0,
p0
w0
Ab+ vb = vAb+ "Ab+ vb = v (I + A) b+ "Ab 5 1:
Moreover, p0Atb is decreasing with respect to t since for any t,
p0A
tb  p0At+1b = p0 (I   A)Atb > 0
following from p0 (I   A) > 0 and Atb > 0. Additionally, noting that
(I   A) 1 = P1=0A  Pt=0A for any t, we obtain that for any t =
1; 2; : : :,
p0
w0
Atb+ vb <
p0
w0
Ab+ vb 5 1;
which completes the proof.
Proposition A.4: Let hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with ! = !Nb be an economy sat-
isfying qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
and vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n   1, vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some i, and v (I + A) b < 1. For w0 = 1 and an arbitrary r  R+,
take p0 such that p0Ab + vb 5 1 and ~p (p0; 1; r) is well-dened, and let
fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = ~p (p0; 1; r). If there exist (!1)2N 2 RnN+ and (x1)2N 2
X such that p0Ax1 = p0!

1 and p1 (I   A)x1 = p1b for every  2 N , then it
constitutes

(xt )2N
	1
t=1
 X such that fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1) is catching-up op-
timal for every  2 N . It thereby guarantees the existence of RS allocations
(xt ; Ax

t )2N
	1
t=1
associated with fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1.
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Proof. The suppositions, qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
and vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n   1,
vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some i, and v (I + A) b < 1, ensure the existence of p0 such
that p0Ab+ vb 5 1 and ~p (p0; 1; r) is well-dened for an arbitrary r  R, by
Lemmas IVVI. Given fpt 1; (wt; rt)g1t=1 = ~p (p0; 1; r), we will show that for
(xt )2N 2 X with pt (I   A)xt = ptb (8 2 N ), there exists
 
xt+1

2N 2 X
such that ptAxt+1 = ptAx

t and pt+1 (I   A)xt+1 = pt+1b (8 2 N ). First,
by Lemma IV, ptAei
ptAen
= pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en holds for i 6= n, and
ptAei
ptAen
> pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en holds
for some i. This property and (xt )2N 2 X  RnN++ together imply that, for
any  2 N ,
ptAx

t
ptAen
=
n 1X
i=1

ptAei
ptAen
xit

+xnt >
n 1X
i=1

pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) enx

it

+xnt =
pt (I   A)xt
pt (I   A) en :
Then, since pt (I   A)xt = ptb, ptAeiptAen =
pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en for i 6= n, and
ptAei
ptAen
>
pt(I A)ei
pt(I A)en for some i, we have:
pt (I   A)xt
pt (I   A) en =
pt (I   A)x
pt (I   A) en =
n 1X
i=1

pt (I   A) ei
pt (I   A) enxi

+ xn
>
n 1X
i=1

pt+1 (I   A) ei
pt+1 (I   A) enxi

+ xn (by Lemma V)
=
pt+1b
pt+1 (I   A) en
for x  (I   A) 1 b with the i-th element xi, so that ptAx

t
ptAen
> pt+1b
pt+1(I A)en
for every  2 N . Dening x^t+1  ptAx

t
ptAen
en, we get ptAx^t+1 = ptAxt and
pt+1 (I   A) x^t+1 > pt+1b. For " > 0, there exists xt+1 2

y 2 Rn++ j ky   x^t+1k < "
	
such that ptAxt+1 = ptAxt and pt+1 (I   A)xt+1 = pt+1b, where kk is the
standard Euclidean norm. Then, the program (MP t+1) has a solution since
its domain is non-empty for xt 2 Rn++ with pt (I   A)xt = ptb.
Suppose that (!1)2N 2 RnN+ and (x1)2N 2 X fulll p0Ax1 = p0!1 and
p1 (I   A)x1 = p1b (8 2 N ). Then, for an arbitrary  2 N , there exists a
solution to the program (MP 1 ), x

1 2 Rn++ with !2  Ax1 , which meets
p1 (I   A)x1 = p1b. Inductively, for t = 2, we can apply Lemma 2 in order
to conclude that xt 1 2 Rn++ with pt 1 (I   A)xt 1 = pt 1b guarantees the
existence of a solution to the program (MP t ). Let us denote this solution
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as xt 2 Rn++ with !t+1  Axt . Then, such xt further yields the existence
of xt+1 2 Rn++ with pt+1 (I   A)xt+1 = pt+1b. As p0Ab + vb 5 1 ensures
that pt (I   A)xt = ptb implies Lxt 2 (0; 1) (8t = 1; 2; : : :) by Lemma VI,
we have fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1). By Corollary 2, fxt g1t=1 2 x (!1), constituted
inductively as argued above, is catching-up optimal for  2 N , i.e., it satises
the RS condition (a) of Denition 1. We note that this approach to constitute
a catching-up optimal path fxt g1t=1 is still admissible when

(xt )2N
	1
t=1

X is additionally assumed. Then, we easily verify that the RS conditions (b)
and (c) since Axt = !

t+1 (8 2 N ;8t = 1; 2; : : :) and (xt )2N ;
 
xt+1

2N 2
X. This completes the proof.
We here consider conditions on the wealth prole that characterize the
initial endowments prole supposed in Proposition A.4. Given ! = !Nb,
we can take p0 such that p0 = p0A + L > 0 and 1p0!Nbp0Ab + vb 5 1.
Indeed, we have already argued that there exists p0 = ~p0 (&0), which is dened
by taking a su¢ ciently small &0 > 0 in order to meet &0q 5 ", such that
p0 = p0A + L and p0Ab + vb 5 1 hold by Lemma VI. Moreover, by the
denition of !Nb = A (I   A) 1Nb, 1
p0!
Nbp0Ab < p0Ab holds.
Let pr1  (1 + r) p0A + (1 + r)L for r = 0. For each  2 [0; 1], we dene
the set
Xr ()  x 2 Rn+ j p0Ax = p0!Nb; pr1 (I   A)x = pr1b; Lx 2 (0; 1)	
with generic element xr (). Note thatXr () is non-empty for some  2 [0; 1],
since (I   A) 1 b 2 Xr   1
N

. Indeed, Axr
 
1
N

= A (I   A) 1 b = 1
N
!Nb
holds, so that
p0Ax
r () = p0Ax
r

1
N

=
1
N
p0!
Nb = p0!
Nb:
Also, (I   A)xr   1
N

= b implies pr1 (I   A)xr
 
1
N

= pr1b. Finally, L (I   A) 1 (Nb) 2
(0; N) implies 1
N
L (I   A) 1 (Nb) 2 (0; 1), so that
Lxr () = Lxr

1
N

= L (I   A) 1 b 2 (0; 1) :
Thus, Xr () 6= ? for some  2 [0; 1).
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Note that Xr () is a compact set of Rn+ for any  2 [0; 1] since p0 > 0
and pr1 > 0. Then, we can take l
r ()  min fLxr () j xr () 2 Xr ()g for
each  2 [0; 1] satisfying Xr () 6= ?, so that lr () 2 (0; 1]. We dene
r  inf f 2 [0; 1] j lr () 2 (0; 1]g ;
where r > 0 by b > 0. We also dene   infr=0 r > 0. Then, consider the
set:
(W0) 
(
(W 0 )2N 2 RN++ j
X
2N
W 0 = 1; min
2N
W 0 > 
)
:
Moreover, let (!)  fp > 0 j p! = 1g.
Theorem A.1: Let hN ; (A;L) ; u; !i with ! = !Nb be an economy satisfying
qAei
Li
> qAen
Ln
and vAei
Li
= vAen
Ln
for i = 1; : : : ; n  1, vAei
Li
> vAen
Ln
for some i, and
v (I + A) b < 1. Let
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
satisfy Lxt = Nvb for all t = 1; 2; : : :.
Moreover, let (W 0 )2N 2 (W0) be a prole of initial wealth endowments.
Then, there exist (p0; w

0) 2 (!)  R++, r  R+, and (!1 )2N 2 RnN+
satisfying p0!

1 = W

0 by which
n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
constitutes an RS
with

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= ~p (p0; w

0; r
).
Proof. Let
 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1
	1
t=1
satisfy Lxt = Nvb for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Propo-
sition A.1 implies that, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, any assignment (xt )2N 2 RnN+
satisfying
P
2N x

t = x

t and Lx

t 2 [0; 1] (8 2 N ) can constitute a
Pareto e¢ cient allocation. Note that xt = (I   A) 1 (Nb) and t = 0 for all
t = 1; 2; : : :. Then, x1 satises pAx

1 = p!
Nb and px1 = Npb + p!
Nb for any
p = 0 by an argument similar to the above case for xr
 
1
N
 2 Xr   1
N

.
Let (W 0 )2N 2 (W0). By the construction, there exists r = 0 such
that min2N W 0 = r, and there exists x (r) 2 Xr (r) with p0 satisfying
p0 = p0A+L > 0 and 1p0!Nbp0Ab+ vb 5 1, and p
r
1  (1 + r) p0A+ (1 + r)L.
Dene p0  1p0!Nbp0 2 
 
!Nb

. Then, there exists ()2N 2 RN++ such that 
!Nb

2N 2 RnN+ and W 0 = p0!Nb (8 2 N ), and thus, we can take
(!1 )2N 2 RnN+ such that p0!1 = W 0 (8 2 N ). For each  2 N , let
x1 2 Rn+ be a solution to:
min
x2Rn+
Lx; s.t. p0Ax = 
p0!
Nb = p0!

1 ; p

1 (I   A)x = p1b;
57
where p1  1p0!Nbp
r
1 = (1 + r) p

0A +
1
p0!
Nb (1 + r)L. As we have seen in
the proof of Proposition A.4, for each t = 1; 2; : : :, there exist (xt )2N and 
xt+1

2N 2 X such that prt 1Axt+1 = prt 1Axt and prt (I   A)xt = prt b
for

prt 1; (wt; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (pr0; 1; r
), where pr0  p0 and r  R+ starts with
r1 = r. Then, taking

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
= p (p0; w

0; r
) for w0  1p0!Nb >
0, we obtain

(xt )2N
	1
t=1
 X such that p0Ax1 = p0!1 , ptAxt+1 =
ptAx

t , and p

t (I   A)xt = pt b for all t = 1; 2; : : :. Let
n 
t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
consist of t = 0 and !

t+1  Axt (8 2 N ;8t = 1; 2; : : :). Then,n 
xt ; 

t ; !

t+1

2N
o1
t=1
constitutes an RS with

pt 1; (w

t ; r

t )
	1
t=1
by Propo-
sition A.4 again.
Remark A.1: Note that in Theorem A1, there is no constraint on r  R+
except for the initial interest rate r1. Therefore, this theorem allows the
existence of an RS in which lim inft!1 rt > R holds.
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